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EFFECTIVE COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST
OVERSIGHT IN HEALTH CARE
William M. Sage†

This Article argues that recent calls for antitrust enforcement to protect health insurers from hospital and physician
consolidation are incomplete. The principal obstacle to effective competition in health care is not that one or the other party
has too much bargaining power, but that they have been buying and selling the wrong things. Vigorous antitrust enforcement will benefit health care consumers only if it accounts for
the competitive distortions caused by the sector’s long history
of government regulation. Because of regulation, what pass
for products in health care are typically small process steps
and isolated components that can be assigned a billing code,
even if they do little to help patients. Instead of further entrenching weakly competitive parties engaged in artificial commerce, antitrust enforcers and regulators should work
together to promote the sale of fully assembled products and
services that can be warranted to consumers for performance
and safety. As better products emerge through innovation
and market entry, competition may finally succeed at lowering
medical costs, increasing access to treatment, and improving
quality of care.

INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF COMPETITION IN HEALTH
CARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. THE HIDDEN PROBLEM: UNASSEMBLED PRODUCTS . . . . .
A. Unassembled Products and the Hegemony of
U.S. Physicians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Regulatory Determinants of Faux Products . . . .
1. Physician Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Hospital-Based Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

611
617

R

617
621
623
625

R

† James R. Dougherty Chair for Faculty Excellence, School of Law, and
Professor (Department of Surgery and Perioperative Care), Dell Medical School,
The University of Texas at Austin. AB, Harvard College; MD, JD, Stanford University. This Article was supported by a grant from The Commonwealth Fund. The
author thanks workshop participants at Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Texas, and
Emory for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and Yale Law School for additional
research support. Molly Colvard, Kelley McIlhattan, and Julian Polaris provided
excellent student research assistance.

609

R

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN302.txt

610

unknown

Seq: 2

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

16-MAR-16

15:47

[Vol. 101:609

3. Insurance Assemblages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Advantages of Assembled Products . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Price and Convenience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Performance and Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. THE ANTITRUST LEGACY OF FAUX PRODUCTS . . . . . . . . . .
A. Managed Care and Insurer-Provider
Contracting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Managed Care and Hospital Mergers . . . . . . . . . .
C. Preparing to Fight the Last War: Merger Policy
and the ACA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. TOWARDS BETTER PRODUCTS: ALIGNING ANTITRUST WITH
REGULATORY CHANGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Product-Enhancing Antitrust Analysis . . . . . . . .
1. Product Market Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Payer Submarkets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Characterizing the Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Unilateral Effects and Status Quo Bias . . . . .
B. Antitrust Enforcement Actions and Product
Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Exclusionary Conduct Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Professional Boards and Purported
State Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Excluding Rival Professions . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Excluding Specialty Hospitals and Their
Physician-Owners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Contractual Entrenchment . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Joint Production or Pricing Cases . . . . . . . . . .
a. “Clinical Integration” and New
Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Product Bundling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. ACOs and Provider Bottlenecks . . . . . . . .
d. Price Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Coordinated Strategies for Improving Health
Care Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Stop Paying for Random Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Publish Prices and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Distinguish Warranty Risk from Insurance
Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Try New Products and Producers . . . . . . . . . .
5. Empower True Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Assure Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Clarify the Role of Health Insurers . . . . . . . . .
8. Promote “Upstream” Health Care . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

630
633
634
636
638

R

641
645

R

649

R

657
660
660
663
664
666

R

668
669

R

669
671

R

672
674
678

R

678
680
680
682

R

684
687
689

R

691
693
694
695
696
698
699

R

R
R
R
R

R

R
R
R
R
R

R

R

R
R

R
R
R

R
R

R
R
R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN302.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 3

ASSEMBLED PRODUCTS

16-MAR-16

15:47

611

INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE
Six years after the passage of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), what has been mainly ideological opposition to “Obamacare” is acquiring a more operational character. Critics are being forced to define more
specifically the reasons for their discontent and to formulate
modifications short of repeal.1 Thus far, the health reform debate has focused primarily on coverage mandates and associated subsidies for the poor and uninsurable.2 As will become
apparent, however, the big issue in American health care is not
redistribution. The big issue is inefficiency.
As conservatives re-engage the health reform debate, their
asserted belief in the power of market forces cannot sidestep a
simple question: Why does the ostensibly competitive U.S.
health care system cost so much and deliver so little? In other
sectors of the economy, the United States celebrates, relies on,
and legally protects market competition.3 Health care in this
country is similarly dominated by private, revenue-seeking activity.4 Yet the outcomes of competition in health care significantly lag performance in other industries.5
Is competition anemic in health care because legal oversight is lax?6 Is not enough attention paid to monopoly and
1
See David Lawder, Senate Republicans Pass Budget Plan, Eye Obamacare
Repeal, REUTERS (May 5, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/06/
us-usa-budget-idUSKBN0NQ2DD20150506 [http://perma.cc/5U9X=GLTP] (noting that while President Obama will certainly veto any repeal of the ACA, the
possibility of negotiating changes thereto remains open); Heidi Przybyla, Senate
Budget Allows Republicans to Seek Obamacare Repeal, BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 5,
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-05/senate-adoptsbudget-that-lets-republicans-seek-obamacare-repeal [http://perma.cc/M6UUEUXG] (stating that the chances of outright appeal of the ACA are slim).
2
See Gail R. Wilensky, The Shortfalls of “Obamacare,” 367 NEW ENG. J.
MEDICINE 1479, 1479 (2012); Przybyla supra note 1.
3
See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, CASES AND PROCEEDINGS, https://
www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings [https://perma.cc/76L6-GPDM]
(detailing various cross-sector enforcement actions brought by the FTC with the
goal of protecting market competition).
4
See CARL F. AMERINGER, THE HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: FROM MEDICAL MONOPOLY TO MARKET COMPETITION 135–36 (2006) (discussing the FTC’s removal of barriers to competition in the health care space and the dominance of the private
market).
5
See id. (discussing industry-specific struggles that the FTC faced).
6
Legal oversight of competition is accomplished primarily through antitrust
law. Federal antitrust law consists of a small number of statutes that authorize
the U.S. Department of Justice and the FTC, as well as private litigants, to seek
sanctions against parties engaging in anticompetitive practices. See Sherman Act
of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012); Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. 52–53 (2012); Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15
U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012). Antitrust law generally develops from judicial interpreta-

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN302.txt

612

unknown

Seq: 4

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

16-MAR-16

15:47

[Vol. 101:609

oligopoly? Are cartels less effectively detected and deterred?
Do more subtle collusive behaviors among health care providers, insurers, and suppliers harm consumers but not provoke a
legal response? Or are there other explanations for the failure
of competition in health care to deliver the best possible products at the lowest possible price?
These questions are coming to the fore as implementation
of the ACA continues, leading more health care organizations
to consolidate and coordinate their activities.7 For the first
time since the 1990s, policymakers face critical decisions
about the focus and intensity of federal antitrust enforcement
activities.8
This Article proposes a competition policy for American
health care that not only is consistent with generally applicable
antitrust law but also works together with regulatory reform to
improve market outcomes for health care consumers. Such a
policy must be more than a political and legal settlement between collectivist and free-market ideologies for control of the
U.S. health care system. It must revisit basic questions about
who competes in health care, what they compete to provide,
and how that competition can be vigorous and successful. The
stakes are considerable. The United States devotes nearly onesixth of its economy to health care,9 crowding out other productive activities and denying Americans those benefits as both
consumers and citizens.
The Article suggests a new explanation for why the American health care system is only weakly competitive and offers
guidance to the federal antitrust agencies, health care regulators, and the courts regarding a more effective competition policy as health reform proceeds. In addition to consolidation,
previous analyses have emphasized lack of consumer information, moral hazard from insurance, and the need for treatment
tion of these statutes, the enforcement decisions of the two federal agencies, and
guidance documents that the agencies release from time to time. States have
similar laws, often enforced by state attorneys general.
7
See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital Pricing, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 11, 28 (2014) (discussing the consolidation of the health care industry as a
response to the ACA).
8
See, e.g., ROBERT A. BERENSON & RACHEL A. BURTON, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF:
NEXT STEPS FOR ACOS 1, 5 (2012) (discussing the controversy regarding modifications to the antitrust enforcement regime for accountable care organizations, or
ACOs).
9
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2013
HIGHLIGHTS (2013), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems
/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/high
lights.pdf [http://perma.cc/95DF-4SH9].
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among those without the ability to pay for it. Some of these
factors are cited by supporters of single-payer systems and
other forms of national health insurance, while critics of such
“socialized medicine” argue that government failure from supplanting the market would be worse than market failure is
today.
Instead, this Article posits that prices for health care are
too high, quality too unreliable, and innovation too limited in
large part because we have been buying and selling the wrong
things. In other complex economic sectors, consumers
purchase assembled products from which they expect concrete, demonstrable benefits. Producers aggressively manage
their supply chains, product performance can be measured,
and products can be warranted for safety and effectiveness. In
health care, by contrast, most consumers purchase only isolated process steps and components.10 Physicians strive to
deliver reimbursable relative value units (RVUs),11 not definitive treatment packages. Hospitals coproduce care in vague
collaboration with physicians and often have limited leverage
over expensive inputs such as medical devices.12 This causes
the health care we receive to be shoddily put together, overly
costly to produce, insufficiently responsive to consumers’
needs, and difficult to monitor for quality.
Why did assembled health care products not develop naturally as an outgrowth of competition? Presumably, it is not
because consumers of health care prefer confusion, unaccountability, or waste. Rather, it is because government policies, not free enterprise, have made the principal revenueseeking actors in the U.S. health care system look and act the
way they do.13 Put differently, many health care transactions
are socially constructed rather than market-driven, which creates the illusion of competition but not the reality.
The American health care system is rife with laws that
shape the competitive terrain, largely dictating how competition occurs, which parties it involves, what dimensions it em10
See Gail R. Wilensky, Developing a Viable Alternative to Medicare’s Physician Payment Strategy, 33 HEALTH AFF. 153, 154–55 (2014) (discussing the division of health care services into discrete units of service).
11
See id. at 155 (reviewing history of Medicare physician payment based on
relative value units).
12
See Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 175, 225–26 (2014) (discussing the FDA’s gatekeeping power with respect to
new medical devices).
13
ROBERT I. FIELD, MOTHER OF INVENTION: HOW THE GOVERNMENT CREATED FREEMARKET HEALTH CARE 24 (2014) (discussing the crucial role of public initiatives in
contemporary private health care).
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phasizes, and whether it succeeds or fails in generating
economic benefits for consumers.14 Many laws are of such
longstanding duration that they have become deeply ingrained
in industry culture and practice.15 The cumulative effects of
this regulatory history are to define products based on professional traditions rather than demonstrated utility and to
render many prices arbitrary, particularly for hospital
services.16
14
Regulation influences not only static characteristics of health care markets
but also their dynamic potential—the forms innovation takes and the processes
by which it occurs. Nearly all industries take pride in making their products and
services less expensive, more convenient, and more reliable. The health care
system has downplayed these consensus goals of innovation. It generates new
“stuff” in abundance, particularly patentable technologies with specialized uses,
regardless of cost, convenience, or certainty of benefit. It devotes far less attention
to process reengineering, supply chain management, and other ways to improve
productive efficiency and satisfy consumer preferences. For a more optimistic
view of the future, see James C. Robinson, Biomedical Innovation in the Era of
Health Care Spending Constraints, 34 HEALTH AFF. 203, 203 (2015) (arguing that
the era of “cost-unconscious” innovation described above is over and health care
innovation is now likely to become more efficient while focusing on “design, pricing, and distribution principles”).
15
Although antitrust law polices private conduct that impedes competition, it
yields readily to other laws, whether federal or state, intended to regulate economic activity on a less competitive basis. See Matthew McDonald, Antitrust
Immunity Up In Smoke: Preemption, State Action, and the Master Settlement Agreement, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 97, 97–98 (2013) (discussing states’ regulatory actions
that would otherwise result in violations of the federal antitrust laws). However,
the regulatory environment is not a defense to private anticompetitive conduct
under the antitrust laws unless Congress impliedly repeals those laws or states
adopt structured alternatives to competition that qualify for “state action” immunity. The Supreme Court recently issued proenforcement rulings in three cases
brought by the FTC that involved regulated entities: the acquisition by a public
hospital of its principal competitor, FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Systems, 133 S.
Ct. 1003 (2013) (public authority to acquire hospitals did not create state action
immunity), a “reverse payment settlement” in which the plaintiff paid the defendant to resolve an infringement suit involving a generic challenger to a patented
drug, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (reverse payment settlements
subject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason), and a campaign by a state
dental board to threaten nondentist teeth whitening businesses and their landlords with criminal prosecution, North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v.
FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (licensing board controlled by members of the regulated profession must be actively supervised by the state itself to claim antitrust
immunity).
16
See Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: How Outrageous Pricing and Egregious Profits
Are Destroying Our Healthcare, TIME, Mar. 4, 2013, at 24–26 (criticizing the exorbitant cost of hospital services). Similar forces are at play in countries with
socialized health care systems, but constraints on medical spending are stronger,
so that the competitive distortions they produce are smaller. See Jonathan Oberlander & Joseph White, Public Attitudes Toward Health Care Spending Aren’t the
Problem; Prices Are, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1285, 1285 (2015) (discussing the United
States’ high medical spending compared to nations with greater constraints on
spending).
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Rather than argue against medical markets, the Article
calls on competition policymakers to rethink the product as
they carry out their legally mandated functions. No matter how
aggressively antitrust law is enforced, it remains a weak tool for
improving consumer welfare in health care if many prices,
nonprice attributes, and choices relate mainly to faux products. Better outcomes are possible only if the antitrust authorities demand greater competition to deliver fully assembled
products that have measurable value to consumers, and if
those authorities work closely with legislators and regulators to
remake the laws that hinder such products from developing on
their own.
Some competition policy is already moving in this direction
as the health care industry restructures in response to existing
pressures on its financial model and to the likely direction of
health care reform.17 But much is not. In particular, fear of
higher provider prices following consolidation has led the federal antitrust enforcement agencies to bring a new series of
challenges to hospital mergers and acquisitions.18 The evaluation under antitrust law of consumer harm from consolidation
and restructuring should be a forward-looking inquiry, particularly in health care where prevailing market conditions do not
reflect a private competitive equilibrium and where regulatory
developments continually change the dimensions and dynamics of competition. Yet much of the agencies’ skepticism of
consolidation assumes the continuation of regulatory policies
that are clearly obsolete.
17
See MARTIN GAYNOR & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., THE
IMPACT OF HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION—UPDATE 2 (2012) (noting the more aggressive
stance of the FTC in recent years as the health care industry restructures).
18
See id. at 1–2. In 2015, a series of high-profile mergers were announced
among health insurers. See Robert Laszewski, Health Insurer Merger Mania—
Muscle-Bound Competitors and a New Cold War in Health Care, FORBES (July 27,
2015, 2:55 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlaszewski2/2015/07/27/
health-insurer-merger-mania-muscle-bound-competitors-and-a-new-cold-warin-health-care/ [https://perma.cc/7HKZ-ZCQS] (discussing possible motives
and effects of insurer consolidation). There are several possible motives for sudden consolidation among insurers, including economies of scale, countervailing
bargaining power against large hospital systems, and maintaining dominance in
local markets. In addition, consolidated insurers would be “too big to fail,” and
would be in a position of particular advantage when doing business with the
federal government in Medicare managed care (so-called Medicare Advantage
plans) and in the ACA’s health insurance exchanges. The consolidation of health
insurers today therefore is reminiscent of defense contractors following the end of
the Cold War. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Korb, Merger Mania: Should the Government
Pay for Defense Industry Restructuring?, BROOKINGS INST. (1996), http://
www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1996/06/summer-defenseindustry-korb
[http://perma.cc/4Y7J-TUKN].
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This does not mean that the current wave of health care
provider consolidation is necessarily benign, or that antitrust
enforcers should lighten their hand.19 It does imply, however,
that the antitrust agencies should work closely with federal
and state regulators as the ACA is implemented to refine predictive tools, reduce barriers to entry and innovation, and orient both regulatory and enforcement activities explicitly to
desired outcomes.
This approach to market oversight would consciously identify and promote specific dimensions and dynamics of competition that have been less than vigorous in the past, such as the
characteristics of health care products, rather than assuming
that those practices reflect consumer preferences. Instead of
refighting the last war over managed care, which emphasized
contract negotiations between health insurers and large health
care providers, competition policymakers would urge the
health care establishment to redefine and improve the products it sells. They would also protect emerging subsectors of
the health care system that might generate more meaningful
products from appropriation by entrenched provider, insurer,
or supplier interests.
Part I of the Article explains why the nature of the product
is a critical but previously unrecognized determinant of health
care competition, tracing its origins to a legal and regulatory
regime that has long distorted and constrained medical markets. Part II describes recent experience with managed care
and hospital mergers and demonstrates the perils of making
assumptions about health care antitrust enforcement as the
regulatory environment changes. Part III identifies aspects of
antitrust analysis that bear directly on product improvement,
makes enforcement recommendations regarding case selection
and evaluation, and proposes a set of priorities that antitrust
19
See GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 17, at 6 (summarizing further changes in
the structure of the health care market and the policy effect of the FTC’s aggressive response to consolidation); WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD
JOHNSON FOUND., HOW HAS HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY
OF HOSPITAL CARE? 11–12 (2006) (outlining the changes in hospital structure and
quality of care brought about by consolidation and potential policy shifts in reaction thereto); Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Is Hospital Competition
Socially Wasteful?, 115 Q.J. ECON. 577, 577 (2000) (concluding that, in the 1980s,
the welfare effects of competition were ambiguous; in the 1990s, however, competition improved social welfare); Daniel P. Kessler & Jeffrey J. Geppert, The Effects
of Competition on Variation in the Quality and Cost of Medical Care 3–4 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11226, 2005) (analyzing the effects
of hospital competition on the level of and the variation in quality of care and
hospital expenditures for elderly Medicare beneficiaries suffering heart attacks);
see also infra text accompanying notes 366–77.
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enforcers and health care regulators should pursue jointly to
induce commerce in more meaningful products.
I
THE HIDDEN PROBLEM: UNASSEMBLED PRODUCTS
Vigorous demand for health care, meaning both willingness and ability to pay for it in private marketplaces, should
create strong incentives for capable supply: high output, competitive prices, quality, choice, and innovation. This has not
happened. After decades of rhetoric unsupported by data, the
United States has finally begun to acknowledge that its health
care system is not superior to other countries’.20 The overall
quality of care we provide is average, and it is plagued by
shameful amounts of error, inattention, and waste.21 Our
clinical technologies remain marvels, but we deploy them with
appalling mediocrity. In the aggregate, nearly $1 trillion of the
over $3 trillion invested annually on American health care may
be misspent.22
American health care innovation, itself an important competitive outcome, has neglected improvements in the organization of care delivery and the achievement of verifiable health
outcomes at both the individual and population levels.23 Instead, it has mainly served to proliferate diagnostic and therapeutic technologies that are improperly used in many
instances.24 Antitrust enforcers assert a desire to promote innovation through competition, but the most important innovations in health care delivery will focus on better ways to
incorporate technology into processes of care, not just technology for its own sake.
A. Unassembled Products and the Hegemony of U.S.
Physicians
In his Pulitzer prize-winning 1982 book, sociologist Paul
Starr catalogued the 150-year transformation of American
medicine into the powerful economic and scientific engine it is
20
See generally SHERRY GLIED, CHRONIC CONDITION: WHY HEALTH REFORM FAILS
1–2 (1997) (discussing public opinion supporting a need for drastic reform to the
U.S. health care system).
21
INST. OF MED., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINUOUSLY LEARNING
HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 101–02 (Mark Smith et al. eds., 2012) (discussing the
costs of the U.S. health care system’s current inefficiency and the need for a
system-wide transformation).
22
Id.
23
See id.
24
See id.
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today.25 At the heart of his analysis was the American medical
profession, which he portrayed as the fixed point of control on
which “revolutionary” change in health care ultimately
turned.26 Although several massive industries have grown
alongside the medical profession, competitive models of health
care delivery still rely heavily on physician direction, as do
proposals for new organizational forms such as the Accountable Care Organization (ACO) and the “patient-centered medical
home” (PCMH).27
In keeping with this core assumption, antitrust law has
been solicitous of good-faith efforts by physicians to improve
care or reduce costs and has been deferential to the methods
they choose to accomplish those goals.28 When physicians
stray beyond even these generous boundaries, moreover, antitrust enforcers often have been satisfied merely to exact a
promise to behave better in the future.29 Contrary to the general preference in antitrust law for structural rather than conduct remedies for proven anticompetitive activities,30 the
enforcement agencies and the courts have only rarely attempted to influence how health care organizations that include physicians should be organized, or how unconcentrated
markets for physician services should remain.31
To a surprising degree, even highly sophisticated medical
services are still conceptualized as extensions of an individual
doctor’s traditional black bag and prescription pad. There was
a time, increasingly remote from the present day, when diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment were solo tasks using handheld
25
See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982)
(discussing the social history of the medical profession in America).
26
See id. at 17–20.
27
A patient-centered medical home (PCMH) is a primary care model that
offers coordinated, accessible care that is focused on quality and safety. PatientCentered Medical Home Recognition, NCQA, http://www.ncqa.org/Programs/Re
cognition/Practices/PatientCenteredMedicalHomePCMH.aspx [http://perma.cc/
6YUV-RX24].
28
Antitrust law was rarely engaged with medicine until the 1970s. See CARL
F. AMERINGER, THE HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: FROM MEDICAL MONOPOLY TO MARKET
COMPETITION 136–37 (2008) (discussing key events that led to the United States’
market-based health system); see infra text accompanying notes 335–40 (discussing clinical integration).
29
Thomas L. Greaney, The Tangled Web: Integration, Exclusivity and Market
Power in Provider Contracting, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 59, 88–90 (2014).
30
See Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Remedies in the United States: Adhering to Sound
Principles in a Multi-Faceted Scheme (Oct. 4, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/speeches/200354.htm [https://perma.cc/YHL6-6TJ7].
31
Greaney, supra note 29, at 70 (discussing the failure of enforcement agencies and the courts to influence hospital organizational structure).
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equipment. Recommended medication was conveyed directly
from physician to patient with instructions for administration.
Transfer of care from one physician to another was complete
when it occurred, albeit with transfer back to the original physician in most cases involving general practitioners and
specialists.
The only aspect of this paradigm that remains similar today is the strength of the therapeutic bond between a patient
and the individual that patient perceives as his or her expert
caregiver. Chemical complexity of therapeutic agents was
largely solved within the conventional framework by having
physicians write prescriptions to be filled by pharmacies for
substances developed by pharmaceutical manufacturers. But
nearly everything else modern medicine offers, beginning with
surgical treatment, requires the coordinated participation of
many individuals with different skills and training in one or
more settings with advanced physical plants, fixed technologies, consumable supplies, and information resources.
What is bought and sold in health care markets has not
kept pace with these technical advances. In other industries,
complex products are sold as assembled units that consumers
understand, that function as advertised, and that can be compared to one another. They are constructed by the manufacturer and typically are offered with some form of warranty for
performance as intended. By contrast, health care emphasizes
incomplete process steps and isolated components rather than
assembled products. Each physician not only performs personal tasks and prescribes medication but also “orders” goods
and services from diagnostic tests to hospitalization, all of
which are provided by others. The same physician also “refers”
patients for consultation by additional physicians and other
health professionals. Many of these consultants behave similarly. Coordination among physicians caring for a particular
patient tends also to be unstructured, governed more by professional conventions than by industrial principles.
Consequently, although the fees that physicians earn
amount only to about 15% of annual health care expenditures
in the United States, an additional 50% or so is initiated and
channeled by physicians through their ordering and referral
behavior.32 Among other things, this telling statistic explains
32
Health policy experts generally put this number at between 2/3 and 3/4 of
health care spending. Cf. Louis Goodman & Timothy Norbeck, Who’s to Blame for
Our Rising Healthcare Costs?, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2013, 9:31 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/04/03/whos-to-blame-for-our-rising-
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the proliferation of fraud and abuse laws. The federal government, which administers Medicare and Medicaid, has enacted
sweeping prohibitions on the payment of remuneration to physicians in exchange for orders or referrals, and on “self-referral”
to entities in which the physician has a financial interest.33
These laws envision physicians as expert, unbiased purchasing
agents for individual inputs, rather than as key personnel in
organized systems of care. Exceptions to fraud laws have been
created to accommodate situations in which physician organizations offer integrated products, but these provisions are often
unrealistically prescriptive because product assembly remains
so atypical.34
Such a fragmented model of health care services bodes
poorly for competition: price, quality, choice, and even innovation mean little if the product is incoherent. The absurdity of
selling unassembled health care products has been parodied in
print and on YouTube.35 Among market participants, recognition of excessive fragmentation has rekindled interest in integrated systems such as Kaiser-Permanente and the Geisinger
Health System and has motivated private and public insurers
to experiment with payment for “bundled, episodic care” delivered to patients with both acute and chronic illnesses.36 In
early 2015, the Secretary of Health and Human Services announced an ambitious goal of tying 90% of Medicare payments
to quality or value by 2018, with 50% governed by payment
arrangements other than fee-for-service.37 It has also been
healthcare-costs/ [https://perma.cc/5Q9T-E4SK] (citing 80% as a “frequently
used number” for the percentage of health care costs that is directed by
physicians).
33
TERRY S. COLEMAN, MEDICARE LAW 294–99 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the selfreferral system in Medicare).
34
See, e.g., JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22743, HEALTH CARE
FRAUD AND ABUSE LAWS AFFECTING MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: AN OVERVIEW, 7–8 (2013)
(criticizing in-office exceptions to fraud law); see also James F. Blumstein, The
Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care Marketplace: Life in the
Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205 (1996) (pointing out that fraud
and abuse laws frequently penalize efficiency).
35
Jonathan Rauch, If Air Travel Worked Like Health Care, NAT’L J. (Sept. 25,
2009) (parodying health care system inefficiency); TheNewAltons, If Air Travel
Were Like Health Care, YOUTUBE (Jan. 4, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=5J67xJKpB6c [http://perma.cc/B4KC-FKZU].
36
M. Susan Ridgely et al., Bundled Payment Fails to Gain a Foothold in
California: The Experience of the IHA Bundled Payment Demonstration, 33 HEALTH
AFF. 1345, 1352 (2014) (discussing California’s bundled care initiative).
37
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Better, Smarter,
Healthier: In Historic Announcement, HHS Sets Clear Goals and Timeline for
Shifting Medicare Reimbursements from Volume to Value (Jan. 26, 2015), http://
www.hhs.gov/news/press/2015pres/01/20150126a.html [https://perma.cc/
6B8E-5KYV].
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noted by management theorists. In his work on redesigning
primary care, for example, Harvard business professor Michael
Porter divides patients into subgroups for whom the core product, not just its nominal price or general quality, differs based
on its value to that subgroup.38
Lack of product assembly has not, however, been incorporated into health care antitrust analysis or competition policy
more generally.39 It is true that professional services are less
likely to follow an assembly model, not only because of regulatory protectionism but also because—unlike physicians—professionals such as lawyers and accountants still sell mainly
their personal time and effort. Even these professions, however, tend to assemble their expertise, information resources,
and professional processes into units, which has opened them
up to competition from online, do-it-yourself companies such
as LegalZoom and TurboTax.40 Medical markets lag rather
than lead with respect to such developments,41 notwithstanding the fact that health care is both more industrialized and
more expensive than other professional domains.
B. Regulatory Determinants of Faux Products
Why do medical markets systematically conflate process
steps, components, and inputs with products? Health economist Sherry Glied distinguishes between traditional “medicalist” models of health care services and more recent “marketist”
models.42 Whereas classic economics regards the tradeoffs between cost and quality that individuals make in market transactions as worthy of respect, “medicalists” reject market
preferences as a basis for health care decisions.43 Instead,
38
Michael E. Porter et al., Redesigning Primary Care: A Strategic Vision to
Improve Value by Organizing Around Patients’ Needs, 32 HEALTH AFF. 516, 525
(2013) (offering a framework to address primary care’s lack of infrastructure and
inability to attract new physicians); see generally MICHAEL E. PORTER & ELIZABETH
OLMSTED TEISBERG, REDEFINING HEALTH CARE: CREATING VALUE-BASED COMPETITION ON
RESULTS 97–98, 200–02 (2006) (reframing health care around integrated practice
units receiving value-based payment).
39
Various regulatory proposals for bundled payment exist, as well as private
bundled payment initiatives. See infra text accompanying notes 103–05, 122,
140 (discussing bundled payment initiatives).
40
When health care is sufficiently basic or standardized so that it does not
require assembly before purchase, chances are that it also can be accessed and
coordinated directly by the consumer, without reliance on a physician at all.
41
See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
42
SHERRY GLIED, CHRONIC CONDITION: WHY HEALTH REFORM FAILS 18–28 (1997)
(discussing different health care service models).
43
See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 941–43 (1963).
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they assert that medical science determines a unique, correct
method of care, albeit one that requires customization based
on each patient’s specific clinical circumstances and exercise of
autonomy in consenting to treatment after being advised of its
risks.44 If medical need is determined by scientific objectivity,
then U.S. physicians—who are selected and trained to epitomize those qualities—can be trusted to apply their own skills
and to recruit outside resources in the correct quantities ad
hoc without prior assembly.
However, an openly market-based model of health care delivery would seem to compare favorably with the randomness
that actually exists. Decades of data convincingly refute the
medicalist model as an accurate description of prevailing practice. Since the 1970s, John Wennberg and others have documented the inconsistency of health care from place to place
across the United States (“small-area variation”), variability
that has no discernable relation to either the prevalence or
severity of illness or the outcomes of treatment.45
Care processes that meet scientific guidelines—so-called
evidence-based medicine—continue to be a goal of many health
care policy experts.46 Even if unjustified clinical variation
could be eliminated by enforcing guidelines, however, it would
still be necessary to produce each scientifically indicated service at acceptable cost, both for paying customers and for those
who require public assistance. Competition would seem important to this process, although countries with socialized
health care systems tend to rely on second-best strategies such
as controls on capital expenditures, global budgets, price-fixing, and rationing.47
44
If medical care is dictated by science but individualized through physician
judgment and compassion, the process of care converges conceptually with its
outcome. As economist Kenneth Arrow noted half a century ago, medicine can be
regarded as an “experience good” not capable of advance evaluation by consumers
because “the outcome of medical care cannot be separated from the process of
receiving it.” Id. at 941–47 (analyzing the operation of the health care industry
and the efficacy with which it satisfies the needs of society).
45
THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTHCARE, Understanding of the Efficiency and
Effectiveness of the Health Care System (2015), http://www.dartmouthatlas.org
[http://perma.cc/6ENP-ZDN6].
46
Harvey V. Fineberg, Foreword to MARK B. MCCLELLAN ET AL., INST. OF MED.,
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF HEALTHCARE: 2007 IOM
ANNUAL MEETING SUMMARY, at v (2008) (exploring evidence-based medicine as a
potential key driver toward greater value and efficiency in medical care).
47
See generally THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, INTERNATIONAL PROFILES OF HEALTH
CARE SYSTEMS, 2013 (Sarah Thomson et al. eds., 2013), http://www.common
wealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2013/Nov/1717
_Thomson_intl_profiles_hlt_care_sys_2013_v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y73H-UJ9S]
(comparing countries with socialized health care systems).
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1. Physician Services
In the private system that prevails in the United States, the
medicalist model has been formalized through laws and norms
that institutionalize deference to physician expertise. For over
a century, health care in the United States has been under the
direction of the American medical profession, which was
granted extraordinary privileges to define its exclusive domain
and to oversee its own clinical and economic conduct.48 At the
same time, physicians have been sheltered by law from both
private corporate control and explicit public governance.49
The unlicensed practice of medicine is prohibited by law in
every state, and the scope of practice for other professionals,
such as nurses and pharmacists, is strictly circumscribed,
often by physician-controlled state licensing boards. Generous
subventions for medical education and training, as well as
costless access for physicians to technologically advanced hospital resources, have fostered the growth of medical specialists
and further increased the economic and political influence of
the profession.50 Very little of the regulation adopted under
this “professional paradigm” directly promoted market competition;51 to the contrary, the activities of physicians only slowly
became subject to federal antitrust law as industry revenues
rose.52
48
Compared to unregulated markets, competition in health care therefore
relies more on physician-sellers’ fiduciary obligations of loyalty to patients, and
less on direct consumer voice and exit (choice). ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE
AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINES IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 1, 40,
63–65 (1970) (discussing alternative ways of reacting to deterioration in business
firms and dissatisfaction with organizations). Accordingly, it is skewed toward
nonprice dimensions, while competition on price is often anemic.
49
STARR, supra note 25, at 13–24.
50
See id. at 77–78 (discussing the role that industrialization has played in
incentivizing medical professionals to specialize).
51
James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical
Care: Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
1459, 1506 (1994) (examining the competing visions of medical care represented
by the professional paradigm and the market-based economic paradigm); Charles
D. Weller, Free Choice as a Restraint of Trade in American Health Care Delivery
and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351, 1392 (1984) (characterizing the traditionally
fragmented health care system as “guild-free choice”).
52
Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust Response, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 939, 940–43, 953 (2001) (discussing antitrust law’s engagement with health care as a consequence of its rapid growth and
commercialization after government became a major purchaser). Over fifty years
elapsed between the passage of the Sherman Act and its application to the American Medical Association’s overt exclusionary policies. See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n v.
United States, 317 U.S. 519, 530–36 (1943) (holding that a restraint of trade
could be evidenced by the fact that physicians and their medical societies conspired to exclude competing physicians affiliated with nontraditional methods of
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The effect of this history has been to equate health care
products with professional process steps. As the technical capacity of medicine increased and health insurance grew common, each new process step became associated with a billing
code, most notably through the compendium of Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes that the American Medical Association maintains (and copyrights).53 Using these codes,
health insurance reimburses physicians and other providers
for the costs associated with each process step, the term “reimbursement” conveying both the presumed nondiscretionary nature of the steps taken and the primarily nonfinancial
motivation ascribed to the health professionals and nonprofit
institutions providing that care.54 Government payment policies, particularly under Medicare, have perpetuated this approach to health care products.55
Refinements in the fee-for-service approach to physician
payment have attempted to discern the true value of care by
paying fairly for each process step but have seldom questioned
the overall coherence of defining medical products in this fashion. The best example is Medicare’s shift in the early 1990s
from reimbursing “customary, prevailing, and reasonable” physician fees to using a resource-based relative value scale
(RBRVS) intended to capture the difficulty and expense of providing individual services.56 Medicare’s Relative Value Scale
Update Committee (RUC) even confers authority on the medical
profession to advise CMS regarding both what processes of care
should be represented in Medicare’s CPT-based physician fee
schedule and how much money physicians should receive for
financing from local societies and to refrain from referrals and consultations with
group practice physicians). And it was not until well after the enactment of
Medicare that specific transactions involving health professionals became targets
for antitrust enforcement. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S.
332 (1982) (holding that maximum fee agreements among physicians constituted
price fixing and were per se unlawful).
53
AM. MED. ASS’N, CPT Coding, Medical Billing and Insurance (2014), http://
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-managing-yourpractice/coding-billing-insurance.page? [http://perma.cc/K3V5-LQF9].
54
See Miriam J. Laugesen, Roy Wada & Eric M. Chen, In Setting Doctors’
Medicare Fees, CMS Almost Always Accepts the Relative Value Update Panel’s
Advice on Work Values, 31 HEALTH AFF. 965, 968–70 (2012).
55
See generally Katharina Janus & Lawrence D. Brown, Medicare as Incubator for Innovation in Payment Policy, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 293, 294 (2007)
(noting the role of Medicare in shaping the U.S. healthcare system).
56
AM. MED. ASS’N, Overview of the RBRVS (2014), http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-managing-your-practice/coding-billing
-insurance/medicare/the-resource-based-relative-value-scale/overview-of-rbr
vs.page [http://perma.cc/5WJF-EHBP].
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engaging in them.57 Unsurprisingly, the RUC has proved a
formidable obstacle to reducing fees or requiring covered services to be of demonstrable value to patients.58
2. Hospital-Based Services
The longstanding fragmentation of health care delivery
among both health professionals and health care facilities and
the lack of connection between those two critical sectors are
also largely the result of government regulation and payment
policies. Even the inpatient services that continue to comprise
the largest portion (roughly 30%) of national health expenditures are requisitioned by physicians but organized and delivered independently of them.59 Improved efficiency therefore
will require both new forms of payment and substantial
changes to hospital structures, including physician affiliation
and employment practices.
A major defect in medical product design is that inpatient
units of service are bifurcated into “professional” and “facility”
components, even though hospitalized patients generally require close coordination between professional skills and institutional resources.60 For example, a patient undergoing
surgery will be charged by the hospital for everything except
physician services, while the surgeons, anesthesiologist, and
surgical pathologist will each generate a separate invoice. Both
private and public insurers typically process claims on this
basis.61 As a result, physicians and hospitals become nonexclusive coproducers of care within hospital walls. Their services are “complementary” but poorly integrated: the
physician’s contribution to patient care is not an input for the
hospital’s output, nor is the hospital’s contribution an input for
the physician’s output.
57
The RUC is composed of 31 physician members approved by the AMA, with
21 nominated by major national medical specialty societies. AM. MED. ASS’N, The
RVS Update Committee (2014), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physicianresources/solutions-managing-your-practice/coding-billing-insurance/medi
care/the-resource-based-relative-value-scale/the-rvs-update-committee.page
[http://perma.cc/FN3D-LAUC] (overview of RUC composition).
58
See Miriam J. Laugesen et al., In Setting Doctors’ Medicare Fees, CMS
Almost Always Accepts the Relative Value Update Panel’s Advice on Work Values,
31 HEALTH AFF. 965, 968–70 (2012).
59
See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Health Expenditures (2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/health-expenditures.htm [http://perma.cc/
PE8C-37L5].
60
See EINER ELHAUGE, Why We Should Care About Health Care Fragmentation
and How to Fix It, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 1, 5 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010).
61
Id. at 9.
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Absent regulation, physicians and hospitals would have a
very different economic relationship. Most American hospitals—and nearly all of the most prominent institutions—are
chartered as nonprofit corporations under state law and are
exempt from federal and state taxation.62 Nonprofit hospitals
may seem like competitive businesses delivering patient care,
but their roots are as community resources and physicians’
workshops.63
Legal constraints on the profit-seeking behavior of
nonprofit hospitals have been a mixed blessing for U.S. health
policy. Because charitable corporations reinvest revenues in
operations rather than paying them as profits to owners,
nonprofit hospitals have helped maintain access to unprofitable services.64 At the same time, however, they have catered
excessively to the preferences of physicians on whom they depend for admissions.65 Nonprofit hospitals have contributed
substantial amounts of uncompensated care, but they have
failed to avert far more massive inefficiencies in the production
of hospital services, the assurance of clinical quality and
62
AM. HOSP. ASS’N, AHA HOSPITAL STATISTICS: 2012 EDITION, at 12 (2012) (showing that 2904 hospitals are nonprofit out of 4985 total in the United States).
Nonprofit hospitals must be organized and operated exclusively for charitable
purposes, may not distribute earnings to private parties, and must provide community benefit through activities such as serving the poor, maintaining an emergency department, and allowing community physicians to join their medical
staffs. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). Even so, many nonprofit hospitals are multibillion dollar enterprises that wield significant economic and political influence. In
recent years, community benefits and other indicia of nonprofit performance have
been made more tangible through detailed reporting requirements and, in a few
states, specified minimum dollar contributions. Section 9007 of the ACA requires
tax-exempt hospitals to (i) conduct a community health needs assessment at least
once every three years; (ii) make financial assistance policies widely available; (iii)
comply with new billing and coding restrictions; and (iv) limit charges for emergency or other medically necessary care. Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 9007, 124 Stat. 855 (2010); see also James R. Hines,
Jr. et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 1179, 1184–85 (2010) (describing the federal and state legal and tax requirements for nonprofit tax privileges).
63
The prohibition on private shareholding also implies that nonprofit hospitals need only support current operations and repay long-term bondholders from
revenues in order to survive, and need not meet short-term earnings targets or
impress the public equity markets with rapid growth, as would be true of for-profit
hospitals. This was intended to reinforce their charitable purposes, but it also
tends to make them complacent. ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH:
AMERICAN HOSPITALS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 40–46, 351–52 (1999) (voluntary
not-for-profit hospitals have been profit-maximizing enterprises, despite viewing
themselves as charities serving the community).
64
David W. Johnson & Nancy M. Kane, The U.S. Health Care System: A
Product of American History and Values, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF US HEALTH CARE:
CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 323, 339 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010).
65
Id. at 338–40.
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safety, and the coordination of care with other providers and
settings.66 Nonprofit hospitals have normalized the invention
and dissemination of expensive medical technologies, but they
have never taken money out of the health care system that
could be used more productively elsewhere, in either the public
or the private economy.67
U.S. hospitals typically have an open, self-governing medical staff through which physicians voluntarily affiliate themselves with the facility, earning “privileges” to admit and care
for patients through screening and ongoing evaluation by other
physicians performing peer review.68 The potential for established competitors to disadvantage new entrants using peerreview processes has long been recognized.69 More generally,
open medical staffs have enabled many physicians, particularly specialists who cannot function without hospital resources, to remain organizationally separated from, and
subject to different incentives than, the hospitals in which they
work and even from their physician colleagues within those
hospitals.70
66

Id. at 341.
Id. at 340.
68
Open medical staffs have been encouraged by state law, and for many
years helped nonprofit hospitals receive favorable federal tax treatment by serving
as evidence of charitable purpose. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Health Care Provider Reference Guide (2004), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicc04.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2Z48-Y74W] (federal tax guidance for health providers); see
also Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and
Ethics of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1384 (2003) (discussing
IRS guidelines encouraging open medical staff organization and governance);
John P. Marren, G. Landon Feazell & Michael W. Paddock, The Hospital Board at
Risk and the Need to Restructure the Relationship with the Medical Staff: Bylaws,
Peer Review and Related Solutions, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 179, 226–28 (2003)
(discussing the current structure of U.S. hospital governance and hospital administrators/board members’ inability to overrule medical staff). Medical staff selfgovernance is also ingrained in the accreditation standards of the Joint Commission, compliance with which qualifies hospitals to participate in Medicare and
Medicaid. See THE JOINT COMMISSION, Medical Staff (CAMH/Hospitals) (Mar. 10,
2011), http://www.jointcommission.org/mobile/standards_information/jcfaqde
tails.aspx?StandardsFAQId=435&StandardsFAQChapterId=74 [http://perma.cc
/9DAB-LFZQ]; Benefits of Joint Commission Accreditation, JOINT COMMISSION (Aug.
28, 2015), http://www.jointcommission.org/benefits_of_joint_commission_ac
creditation/ [https://perma.cc/X3WR-ASA8].
69
See Philip C. Kissam et al., Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the
Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 636–37 (1982) (analyzing potential
antitrust problems with medical staff self-governance leading to privilege denials
of other practitioners); see also Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105 (1988) (holding
the state-action doctrine did not protect Oregon physicians from federal antitrust
liability for their activities on hospital peer-review committees).
70
Kissam et al., supra note 69, at 612–13.
67
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This loose form of physician-hospital collaboration is common only in the United States and Canada. In most other
developed countries, primary care physicians work exclusively
in their private offices or small clinics, and specialist physicians are hospital employees.71 In the last few years, employment of physicians by hospitals has grown rapidly in states
that permit it.72 Because of decades of customary practice,
however, merely employing physicians has rarely induced hospitals to create true “integrated practice units.”73 In several
states (including Texas and California), moreover, legal
prohibitions on the corporate practice of medicine continue to
restrict the direct employment of physicians by other entities,
making it even more difficult to coordinate the services of
health professionals and health care facilities.74
The cumulative effect of the regulatory environment has
been to disaggregate hospital care into the smallest possible
units of service, promote rapid adoption of new technologies
while freezing their prices at high initial levels, encourage hospitals to incur reportable and therefore reimbursable costs,
and create an equally stylized set of “charges” of uncertain
relationship to reported costs.75 As a result, U.S. hospital
prices are shockingly high, variable, and arbitrary, recently
reaching a degree of irrationality and unfairness that has attracted criticism not only from journalists but also from schol-

71

THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, supra note 47, at 13–14.
See generally AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 62.
73
See Michael E. Porter & Thomas H. Lee, The Strategy That Will Fix Health
Care, 91 HARV. BUS. REV. 50 (2013) (listing integrated practice units as a core
component of value).
74
See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 2400, 2052 (West 2012) (regulations
providing that corporations cannot have professional licenses and requiring physicians to have a license in order to practice medicine); TEX. OCC. CODE. ANN.
§§ 155.001, 155.003, 157.001, 164.052, 165.156 (West 2012) (regulations on
physicians licensing and corporation’s ability to hire physicians); People v. Cole,
135 P.3d 669, 672 (Cal. 2006) (describing California law that bans corporate
practice of medicine); Flynn Bros., Inc. v. First Med. Assocs., 715 S.W.2d 782, 785
(Tex. App. 1986) (holding that a corporation of lay people is unlawfully practicing
medicine when it hires physicians to treat patients). Other states have limited
exceptions for licensed hospitals. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6522 (McKinney 2006) (statute requiring physicians to have a license); People v. John H. Woodbury Dermatological Inst., 85 N.E. 697, 698 (N.Y. 1908) (holding that specially licensed
hospitals were the only corporations with the authority to practice medicine). In
1997, the Illinois Supreme Court clarified that licensed hospitals (but not other
corporations) could legally employ physicians. Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln
Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 114 (Ill. 1997).
75
See Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME (Mar. 4,
2013).
72
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ars and regulators.76 This fact alone has serious adverse
consequences for market efficiency, which depends on honest
prices to convey granular information to both producers and
consumers about production options and their associated
costs.77 Moreover, hospitals have had little incentive to measure, much less attempt to reduce, the aggregate resource
costs of treating a patient for a particular condition, in large
part because hospital services are sold as physician-ordered
care components, not assembled services.78
Per-service hospital prices are poor predictors of overall
hospital spending because the volume of service—both the decision to hospitalize and the intensity of treatment once hospitalized—typically remains under the discretionary authority of
physicians who are subject to a different set of financial and
nonfinancial incentives. For example, control over per-service
prices without control over the volume of services delivered was
a recognized problem with Medicare’s RBRVS program from the
outset, justifying the inclusion of a Volume Performance Standard (VPS) or “behavioral offset” that automatically reduced
fees in response to unjustified increases in volume.79
Care is also poorly coordinated between different facilities
and with community-based sources of treatment. “Post-acute”
services such as rehabilitation, for example, are currently a
major source of cost variability for the Medicare program.80
More broadly, efficient care delivery—and ultimately improved
health—requires most services to be accessible outside of the
76
See id.; see also Fuse Brown, supra note 7, at 39–41 (criticizing hospital
health care service prices); MASS. ATT’Y GEN.’S OFFICE, Examination of Health Care
Cost Trends and Cost Drivers, pursuant to G.L. c. 6D, § 8 1, 6–8 (2013) (analyzing
recent market developments and Massachusetts’s efforts to promote efficient and
effective delivery of health care).
77
See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE USE OF KNOWLEDGE IN SOCIETY 12–13 (1945)
(arguing that a centrally planned economy could never match the efficiency of an
open economy because of the dispersed nature of information spread throughout
society).
78
See Fuse Brown, supra note 7, at 23.
79
See John M. Eisenberg, Rethinking the Role of Health Care Providers: The
Physician’s Perspective, in IMPROVING ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE: THE
PROVIDER PERSPECTIVE 22, 37 (1991).
80
David C. Grabowski et al., Medicare Postacute Care Payment Reforms Have
Potential to Improve Efficiency of Care, But May Need Changes to Cut Costs, 31
HEALTH AFF. 1941, 1947 (2012) (discussing the ACA’s potential to compromise the
delivery of patient-appropriate post-acute services). A major goal of Medicare’s
new bundled payment program for joint replacement is to normalize postacute
spending. See Steven A. Farmer et al., Breaking Down Medicare’s Bold New
Proposal to Transform Hip and Knee Replacements, BROOKINGS (Aug. 11, 2015,
1:12 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/health360/posts/2015/08/joint-re
placement-model-care [http://perma.cc/YZM5-SMA7].
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hospital setting, both at reconfigured ambulatory care sites
and in more innovative locations such as retail stores, schools,
and workplaces.81
3. Insurance Assemblages
Over the last half century, the percentage of health care
costs paid directly by patients has diminished substantially,
while the amount paid through health insurance has increased.82 For private health insurance markets, this growth
reflects the fact that serious illness can be an unpredictable
and expensive event, augmented by the scale economies and
tax subsidies associated with insurance coverage being offered
as a fringe benefit of employment. For public insurance programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, growth represents a
combination of social solidarity for the elderly regardless of
income and redistributive commitments to groups of lowerincome individuals deemed deserving of assistance.83
Critics of health insurance often attribute overuse of services and general price insensitivity within the health care system to the moral hazard inherent in third-party payment.84
However, health insurance also perpetuates false products by
aggregating professional process steps and other traditional
care components and inputs into assemblages that appear coherent but remain disconnected from the efficient solution of
complex medical problems.85
81
See Cynthia Napier Rosenberg et al., Results from a Patient-Centered Medical Home Pilot at UPMC Health Plan Hold Lessons for Broader Adoption of the
Model, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2423, 2423–24 (2012) (describing the innovative delivery of
health care through patient-centered medical homes); William M. Sage, Out of the
Box: The Future of Retail Medical Clinics, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 4–6
(2009) (discussing the potential efficiencies of retail medical clinics).
82
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., National Health Expenditures 2013
Highlights (2013), http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/high
lights.pdf [http://perma.cc/KJC2-NLBQ] (reporting national health care costs for
2013).
83
See Theodore R. Marmor, American Health Care Policy and Politics: Is Fragmentation a Helpful Category for Understanding Health Reform Experience and
Prospects?, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 343,
356 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010); David M. Cutler & Jonathan Gruber, The Effect of
Medicaid Expansions on Public Insurance, Private Insurance, and Redistribution,
86 HEALTH ECON. 378, 379 (1996).
84
D. ANDREW AUSTIN & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40834, THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY 18–19 (2010);
Liran Einav et al., Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance, 103 AM. ECON.
REV. 178, 217 (2013) (discussing health insurance moral hazards and causes).
85
See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Reed Abelson, Medicare Bills Rise for Stents Put
into Limbs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2015, at A1 (questioning Medicare payment to
cardiologists for peripheral arterial stents).
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Modern health insurance in the United States began with
Blue Cross, which was a collective endeavor by hospitals to
assure themselves of payment during the Great Depression by
offering their communities a way to prepay for services if
needed.86 Physicians came up with a related strategy, Blue
Shield, setting the tone for partitioning institutional and professional services within insurance coverage.87 When Medicare
was enacted in 1965, it replicated this structure by creating a
compulsory social insurance system to cover hospitals and
other facilities (Part A) and a separate, voluntary but subsidized premium system to cover care by physicians and other
health professionals (Part B).88 Separating hospital from physician coverage in Medicare using constructs familiar from private indemnity insurance both blunted organized medicine’s
opposition to “socialized medicine” and allayed its fear of corporate control.89
Supported by state and federal law, most private and public health insurance policies still employ this piecemeal approach to benefit design, typically adding more categories of
covered services that are merely care components or inputs,
such as diagnostic testing, prescription drugs, and durable
medical equipment.90 Within each category, coverage may still
be denied if a service is not “medically necessary,”91 but determinations of medical necessity are linked to claims, and claims
are almost always for unassembled products.92
Taking a longer view of health care markets, moreover,
commercial insurers act as purchasing intermediaries, not actual consumers of health care. At best, they are weak agents
for buyers; at worst, they are self-interested middlemen. They
86
Alex Blumberg & Adam Davidson, Accidents of History Created U.S. Health
System, NPR (2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11
4045132 [https://perma.cc/P635-VERJ] (detailing creation of Blue Cross health
insurance as a consequence of historical events).
87
Marc Lichtenstein, Health Insurance from Invention to Innovation: A History
of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Companies, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD BLOG
(2015), http://www.bcbs.com/blog/health-insurance.html#.VfYwHdNViko [http:
//perma.cc/6FTB-89GL].
88
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., History (2014), http://www.cms.
gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/History/index.html?redirect=/history/
[http://perma.cc/7HX9-K8EE].
89
Shawn Martin, Medicare and Medicaid: ‘Doing the Right Thing for Those in
Need,’ AAFP: IN THE TRENCHES (June 23, 2015), http://blogs.aafp.org/cfr/inthe
trenches/entry/medicare_and_medicaid_doing_the [http://perma.cc/ZM2YLPXN].
90
Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1647 n.31 (1992).
91
Id.
92
See id. at 1666–68.
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turn a respectable profit and have every reason to maintain
their existing market role and business practices. Many are
for-profit organizations facing limited competitive pressure.93
Whether to comply with regulation, reduce potential legal liability, or simply avoid controversy, insurers tend to refrain from
directly influencing clinical care and focus their attention on
negotiating fees for conventional services.94
Inertia and such perverse incentives make it unlikely that
private insurers will convert their covered benefits from assemblages of process steps into assembled products anytime soon.
Much of their business is not even true insurance with risk of
loss, in that many insurers administer coverage for self-insured employers or base their premiums on highly predictable
annual group experience.95 Most health insurers earn revenue
primarily by processing claims involving large networks of participating providers that also contract with rival companies or
by doing similar tasks as subcontractors for Medicare.96 Consequently, they have little cause to decrease the volume of
claims by moving from reimbursable process steps to assembled products, a transition that would also force them to revisit
the basic structure of their benefits. To the contrary, offering
seemingly comprehensive coverage of faux products through
inclusive networks of hospitals and physicians discourages
competition from other insurers, while (falsely) reassuring regulators that policyholders are not receiving less than they contracted to receive.
In addition to separating physician from hospital coverage,
Medicare as enacted in 1965 included several features intended to gain critical support from organized medicine.97
These compromises further subsidized trade in unassembled
products: a pledge of noninterference with existing medical
practice, repayment of hospitals’ reported costs plus a reasonable profit margin and capital cost allowance, payment of physicians’ “customary and prevailing” fees, and claims
93

Fuse Brown, supra note 7, at 54–55.
See ELHAUGE, supra note 60, at 9; Clark C. Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J. 303, 338 (1978).
95
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 34, at 23–25.
96
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/OSI-99-7, IMPROPRIETIES BY CONTRACTORS COMPRISED MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY (1999) (analyzing whether Medicare
contractors participated in any improper or questionable practices that contributed to fraud, waste, or abuse in the Medicare federal health insurance program).
Serving government programs more profitably seems to be a motivator of recent
health insurance merger activity. See Pear, infra note 131.
97
See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286
(1965).
94
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administration by familiar private organizations (mainly Blue
Cross and Blue Shield plans)98 rather than a government
agency.99 Although most of these characteristics have been
modified, they set a tone for public coverage in the United
States that was deferential to private practice and welcoming of
entrepreneurial investment but undemanding with respect to
competitive outcomes.
Public funding generally comes with strings attached, and
Medicare and Medicaid are replete with conditions of participation, payment specifications, and associated procedures and
prohibitions. Beginning as early as 1972, for example, Congress set in motion a series of increasingly strict penalties for
“fraud and abuse.”100 Unfortunately, the broad restrictions on
financial transactions imposed by these laws have served as
much to deter potentially efficient contractual affiliations between physicians and hospitals as to reduce unnecessary
care.101 Because hospitals design their clinical and financial
workflow primarily to comply with the rules and respond to the
incentives established by Medicare and Medicaid, and private
payers routinely adopt standards and practices based on government benchmarks, this additional disincentive to product
assembly spilled over to the private insurance marketplace as
well.
C. Advantages of Assembled Products
In the vast majority of commercial markets, competition
reduces price, increases timeliness of access or use, and improves performance. Although those goals are mainstays of
industrial engineering, health care markets have typically regarded such pedestrian objectives with disdain or embarrassment.102 Competition policy needs to overcome this resistance
98
See Rick Mayes, The Origins, Development, and Passage of Medicare’s Revolutionary Prospective Payment System, 62 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 21, 23–24
(2007).
99
79 Stat. at 291, 309–11, 322–23.
100
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c (2012); see also Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(b) (2012) (prohibiting the exchange, or offer of exchange, of any remuneration to reward, or induce, referrals of business for federal health care programs, including Medicare and Medicaid).
101
James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health
Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 224
(1996) (discussing inconsistencies between fraud law and market need).
102
See, e.g., Susan Dentzer, It’s Past Time to Get Serious About Transforming
Care, 32 HEALTH AFF. 6, 6 (2013) (“One eternal mystery of US health care is why
patients and payers have been loath to demand attributes they take for granted in
other sectors of the economy, such as convenience, price transparency, and reasonable costs.”).
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and restore normalcy to the first-pass criteria for what makes a
health care product “better.” From this perspective, selling
more health care products on a fully assembled basis has substantial advantages.
A range of assembled products can be designed to meet
clinical need and consumer demand, but they are not explicitly
distinguished in the health policy literature from their less cohesive counterparts based on the effectiveness of the competition that they are capable of generating.103 Assembled
products offering definitive care for an acute problem (e.g., joint
replacement, coronary artery bypass grafting) might include all
professional services, facility use, and medical supplies, plus
standard rehabilitative care, and might come with a warranty
to cover treatment failure or complications. Patients with
chronic disease might purchase a year of maintenance therapy
and secondary prevention. Assembled diagnostic services
might range from an examination with explanation and reassurance, to a single scan for follow-up of a known condition, to
a full work-up for grave or unusual symptoms.
Several assembled products exist today, such as simple
diagnostics and definitive treatments for minor illnesses and
injuries.104 Others are being developed, such as all-inclusive
treatment for cardiac conditions, orthopedic problems, or
cancers, and packaged maintenance therapy for chronic diseases.105 Medical tourism often involves assembled products.106 Even end-of-life care can be thought of in terms of
assembled products, as the hospice industry demonstrates.107
1. Price and Convenience
Prices should be known to individual buyers in advance,
should be transparent to buyers as a group, and should tend to
103
See, e.g., Porter et al., supra note 38, at 521–22 (suggesting that bundled
payments may result in better value for patients).
104
See William M. Sage & Kelley McIlhattan, Upstream Health Law, 42 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 535, 540–41 (2014).
105
See Terry Shih et al., Will Bundled Payments Change Health Care?: Examining the Evidence Thus Far in Cardiovascular Care, 131 CIRCULATION 2151, 2152,
2154 (2015); Cheryl Clark, CMS Announces Bundled Care Payments for Oncology,
HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA (Feb. 16, 2015), http://healthleadersmedia.com/content/
QUA-313227/CMS-Announces-Bundled–Care-Payments-for-Oncology [http://
perma.cc/RBV7-8F2C].
106
See DEVON M. HERRICK, NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, MEDICAL TOURISM:
GLOBAL COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE 4 (2007).
107
MEDICARE LEARNING NETWORK, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HOSPICE
PAYMENT SYSTEM: PAYMENT SYSTEM FACT SHEET SERIES 4 (2013).
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the uniform (i.e., not be highly variable or discriminatory).108 If
sellers cannot compete on price, it is a clue that the product is
wrong. In the health care system, accurate prices are often
unavailable because assembly is done piecemeal as charges
accrue.
When health care products are unassembled and disorganized, moreover, it is difficult to determine and reduce the cost
of producing them. For example, a large amount of waste occurs within hospitals in connection with the treatment of serious illness, in part because facilities that are paid for
disaggregated units of service tend to be much better attuned
to their revenue streams than to their cost structures.109 Production models for facility-based care also typically place physicians in independent, loosely supervisory roles rather than as
part of integrated and experienced teams.110
Health care is seldom convenient even when it is affordable. The inconvenience of accessing care in most instances,
despite the enormous private and social resources devoted to
it, is another indication that it is being delivered in arbitrary
increments rather than being packaged into service units that
correspond to patient benefit. Convenience is also a proxy for
innovation given the many barriers to entry by new competitors
that result from strong traditions of physician control and associated professional regulation.111
Consider products that might improve underlying health.
Americans are far less healthy than our wealth suggests we
should be.112 Empowering markets to redesign health care as
they do other consumer goods would distribute both basic
medical care and health-protective services widely across com108
Since the 1990s, policymakers and researchers have worked energetically
toward measurable, transparent quality of care. See, e.g., About Us, NAT’L QUALITY
F. (2015), http://www.qualityforum.org/story/About_Us.aspx [http://perma.cc/
Z94Z-5M4P]. These efforts, while laudatory, largely presuppose a tradeoff between price and quality that has seldom characterized the health care system in
operation. Quality metrics help improve health outcomes, but by taking the
longer view it is hard to escape the conclusion that competition over quality
cannot occur unless price competition is also vigorous.
109
See Blumstein, supra note 34, at 206.
110
See, e.g., TEX. OCC. CODE. ANN. § 157.054 (West 2012).
111
See Blumstein, supra note 51, at 1465–66.
112
See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD HEALTH STATISTICS 2014:
HOW DOES THE UNITED STATES COMPARE? (2014), http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/Briefing-Note-UNITED-STATES-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/C757-CDZ5]
(data comparing the health of U.S. citizens to other countries); see also Barbara
Starfield, Commentary, Is US Health Really the Best in the World?, 284 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 483, 483 (2000) (discussing information concerning the deficiencies of
U.S. medical care).
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munities and embed them in the daily, routine activities of
people who need not be labeled as “patients” in order to be
served.113 Competition for these services would promote personal engagement with health on the part of the consumerpatient (e.g., through smartphones) and less expensive, more
accessible one-on-one care relationships. Whereas assembled
products delivering acute or complex care would likely remain
covered by health insurance, consumer choice regarding basic
care and health promotion could be more flexible, with a larger
range of professional and nonprofessional skills and service
settings, and with less insurance involved.
2. Performance and Safety
Assembled products usually work. By contrast, many
health care services provided in this country do not meet patients’ needs. The Institute of Medicine’s estimated $750 billion in annual waste included $210 billion for unnecessary
services and $130 billion for inefficiently delivered, sometimes
harmful, services.114 A priority for health care competition is to
generate products and services that do people clear good and
are priced accordingly.
If each product is delivered assembled, it is easier to warrant against additional cost if there are safety lapses or if results stray from the expected.115 Warranties have been
underused in health care, in large part because lack of product
assembly vested physicians with legal liability for failings attributable to their own negligence but denied any single party
financial or operational control over quality.116 In recent years,
a few integrated health care organizations have begun to offer
113
See Sage & McIlhattan, supra note 104, at 535 (defining the “upstream” as
where the label of “patient” has not yet attached).
114
INST. OF MED., supra note 21, at 102.
115
For example, many providers of in vitro fertilization offer substantial refunds if a live birth does not occur. See Jim Hawkins, Financing Fertility, 47 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 115, 115 (2010) (noting that the way in which fertility treatments are
financed is virtually unparalleled in other areas of medicine). As this example
suggests, quality warranties for products covered by health insurance and for
self-paid products are likely to differ.
116
In the 1990s, expectations that fully integrated HMOs would control both
cost and quality produced recommendations for both warranties and “enterprise
liability” for medical malpractice. William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the
Emerging Managed Health Care System, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 166–67
(1997) (recommending enterprise liability); see William S. Brewbaker III, Medical
Malpractice and Managed Care Organizations: The Implied Warranty of Quality, 60
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 118 (1997) (recommending warranties). In operation,
however, managed care seldom possessed attributes compatible with those approaches. See infra text accompanying notes 142–68.
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packaged treatment for a preset price that includes additional
care when necessary.117 This trend should continue as Medicare shifts more covered services to bundled payment.
In addition to enabling outcomes of care to become more
reliable, competition in assembled products can make patients
safer while they receive care. Uncertainty is part of medicine,
but many processes of care are controllable. System failure
rather than individual malfeasance is the root cause of most
medical errors,118 and a standardized practice environment
with efficient coordination and teamwork is likely to be safer as
well as cheaper.119 The process of keeping patients safe is
considerably simpler when the extent of care is determined in
advance and sold as a package.120 Offering a coherent package
of services also makes the task of communicating residual
risks of treatment failure or physical harm more straightforward (e.g., in the course of obtaining informed consent).121
Finally, it is important to explain what a move to assembled products is not. First, it is not a request for a new government-sponsored compendium of service units that replaces old
compendia such as relative value units, CPT codes, or Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs).122 A central thesis of this Article is
that markets will supply such products if the regulatory barriers to doing so are removed and if antitrust enforcers are alert
to private anticompetitive activity that preserves the status
quo. Second, support for assembled products is not an endorsement of “cookbook medicine.”123 Many medical problems
117
Geisinger Health Plan is one example, though a less dramatic one than has
been suggested. See supra note 36 and infra note 405 and accompanying text.
118
INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 65 (Linda
T. et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter “TO ERR IS HUMAN”].
119
See INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 83 (2001) (arguing for increased cooperation between clinicians); TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 118, at 37 (suggesting that emergency departments can decrease adverse events by increasing teamwork and standardizing
procedures).
120
Cf. TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 118, at 36–37 (noting poor systems cause
more errors).
121
See generally JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE 212–17 (2d ed. 2001) (summarizing contemporary informed
consent).
122
Medicare’s new joint replacement bundles, for example, serve as complex
retrospective adjustments to existing payment formulas rather than straightforward invitations to provide integrated care for a flat fee. See Robert E. Mechanic,
Mandatory Medicare Bundled Payment—Is It Ready for Prime Time?, 373 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1291 (2015) (explaining the details of the Medicare proposal).
123
Marshall B. Kapp, Commentary, ‘Cookbook Medicine’: A Legal Perspective,
150 JAMA ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 496, 499 (1990) (noting a move toward the use
of formalized clinical practice guidelines).
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require expert judgment and discretion. That products be offered in assembled form is entirely compatible with customization; assembly merely implies that significantly different
clinical needs be properly categorized in advance of sale. Third,
assembled products do not represent a frontal assault on professional ethics. Competition policymakers should be skeptical
about infusing economic relationships with too much moral
content; naı̈ve subsidies for medical professionalism have contributed significantly to the flaws in existing health care products. Well-trained, compassionate people delivering assembled
health care products will continue to view the relief of human
suffering as their primary duty. But they will pursue this mission with more effective teamwork, clearer accountability, and
less waste.
II
THE ANTITRUST LEGACY OF FAUX PRODUCTS
To understand competition policy today, it is necessary to
go back one generation of health care reform. Health care providers appear to be experiencing a wave of consolidation last
seen in the early 1990s.124 After taking office in January 1993,
President Clinton conducted an intensive exercise in policy development within the executive branch, leading to the introduction in Congress later that year of a bill expanding health
insurance coverage.125 The Clinton Administration’s health reform bill shared with President Nixon’s earlier proposal a mandate on private employers to offer health coverage and a
preference for “managed competition” among private health
maintenance organizations over a single-payer approach.126
As the economy revived and health security became a less
pressing concern for working Americans, however, public opinion turned against the bill, which came to be viewed as threatening jobs, compromising individual choice, and interposing
124
See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A
DOSE OF COMPETITION, ch. 3, at 11 (2004), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/improving-health-care-dose-competition-report-federaltrade-commission-and-department-justice/040723healthcarerpt.pdf [http://
perma.cc/9MPE-KHFD].
125
Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103rd Cong. (1994); see generally Wendy
K. Mariner, Patients’ Rights to Care under Clinton’s Health Security Act: The Structure of Reform, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1330, 1330–31 (1994) (discussing the
history of the Health Security Act).
126
Mariner, supra note 125, at 1331; see infra notes 207–09 (explaining managed competition).
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bureaucratic obstacles to care.127 The bill’s defeat, and the
related shift of Congress to Republican control in 1994, ceded
the field to private employers and health plan administrators to
control costs themselves.128 This led to a rapid, nationwide
transition to a managed care model that actively involved
health insurers in delivering medical care, typically based on
contracts with physicians, hospitals, and other health care
providers.129
Antitrust law played an important role in how health care
markets developed following the Clinton reform proposal, and
it is likely to do the same today under the ACA. Both efforts
promised sweeping legislation that would induce major
changes to the health care industry.130 Then as now, many
market participants worried that the restructuring necessary
to succeed in a reformed system might subject them to antitrust liability, and they asked the enforcement agencies for
clarification and hopefully reassurance.131 Others circled the
wagons intending to insulate their organizations from change,
which sometimes forced the agencies to investigate and respond.132 Both the Clinton proposal and the ACA also provoked a popular backlash, which was sufficiently strong in the
former case to prevent the bill’s passage.133 The result in the
1990s was market restructuring undisciplined by a consistent
or comprehensive regulatory framework.134 Whether today’s
opposition to “Obamacare” leads to a similar situation remains
to be seen.
Although a wide range of potentially anticompetitive practices are subject to the antitrust laws, corporate mergers and
acquisitions that reduce the number of independent competi127
See Elizabeth McCaughey, No Exit, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 7, 1994), http://
www.newrepublic.com/article/health-care/no-exit [http://perma.cc/DHY3M9Y2] (criticizing the Health Security Act and suggesting “alternatives [could]
provide urgently needed reform of the health insurance industry, outlawing its
worst abuses, without taking important decisions away from patients and their
doctors and without depriving Americans of effective, high-tech medical care
when they are seriously ill”).
128
See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and
American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1703–04 (1999).
129
See id.
130
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148,
§ 1311, 124 Stat. 173 (2010); Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103rd Cong. (1994).
131
See Thomas Greaney, Thirty Years of Solicitude: Antitrust Law and Physician Cartels, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 189, 205–06 (2007); Robert Pear, As
Health Law Spurs Mergers, Risks Are Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2010, at A1, A23.
132
See Greaney, supra note 131, at 217; Pear, supra note 131.
133
See William M. Sage, Commentary, Putting Insurance Reform in the ACA’s
Rear-View Mirror, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1081, 1104–05 (2014).
134
See Sage, supra note 128.
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tors tend to be the most visible and controversial transactions.135 Scrutiny of proposed mergers and acquisitions is an
important aspect of antitrust enforcement because U.S. law is
limited in its capacity to correct problems once market power
exists.136 At the same time, merger cases illustrate the path
dependence of today’s insured health care markets, highlight
the constitutive role of government, and demonstrate the
hazards of basing competition policy on historical rather than
forward-looking assumptions about health care products.137
Integration, bundled and episodic payment, and accountability for outcomes through both financial incentives and better
information are now widely discussed and expected among
policymakers and the educated public.138 Yet antitrust enforcement continues to analyze many interactions involving
commercial health insurers and hospitals as simple negotiations between buyers and sellers to purchase medical services
at agreed upon, “discounted” fees for unassembled products.139 That model narrowly reflects the contracting practices
of the late 1990s and 2000s, a period devoid of major regulatory innovation, and disregards the direction being set for both
public and private health insurance under the ACA.140 Taking
a longer view, continually rising health care expenditures and
persistent shortcomings in quality and safety suggest that
many health insurers and providers have been engaged in
Kabuki theatre involving faux products that simulates hardnosed bargaining but fails to demand or deliver value for
money, and that not infrequently erects barriers to competitive
entry and innovation.

135
See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012) (detailing the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act’s premerger notification requirements).
136
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Consolidation, and the Consequent Impact on Competition in Health Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law, 113th Cong. 93–96 (2013)
(statement of Thomas L. Greaney, Chester A. Myers Professor of Law, St. Louis
University School of Law).
137
See infra subpart II.B.
138
See infra text accompanying notes 338–65.
139
See infra subpart II.C.
140
See infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text; see also Bruce Jaspen,
Though Obamacare Pays Less, Providers Flock to ‘Bundled’ Medicare Payments,
FORBES (Feb. 1, 2013, 8:15 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/
2013/02/01/though-obamacare-pays-less-medical-providers-flock-to-bundledmedicare-payments/ [http://perma.cc/S36E-GUSE] (explaining how under the
ACA many hospitals are moving away from the traditional fee-for-service model
towards “bundled” payments).
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A. Managed Care and Insurer-Provider Contracting
The political failure of the Clinton administration’s Health
Security Act in 1994 led government to abandon its leadership
position on health care reform and opened an opportunity for
private managed care organizations to fill the vacuum. This
“managed care revolution” claimed authority to address serious problems with the cost-effectiveness and quality of health
care that researchers and policy experts had by then identified.141 Operating primarily through selective contracting to
create tightly controlled networks of providers, managed care
organizations instituted aggressive cost containment strategies
such as preauthorization requirements for hospital admission
and surgical procedures, concurrent review of the necessity of
continued hospitalization, mandatory referrals from primary
care physician “gatekeepers” to access specialty care, and alternatives to fee-for-service payment (e.g., capitation, withholds) to induce physicians to reduce utilization of services.142
Prepaid health plans had a long history in the U.S. health
care system by the 1990s, but their role was often a marginal
one because of organized opposition from American physicians.143 Beginning with the Nixon administration, however,
HMOs such as Kaiser-Permanente (from President Nixon’s
home state of California) became models for national health
reform.144 Many of these organizations also had visionary physician leadership capable of both articulating and operationalizing more cost-effective approaches to care emphasizing
disease prevention. Indeed, Kaiser-like HMOs sell an assembled, comprehensive insurance product to consumers on a
fully budgeted basis.145 They manage their costs holistically146
141

See FIELD, supra note 13, at 38–44.
Capitation is a contracted rate paid in advance to the physician per assigned patient, regardless of the number or nature of health care services provided. See Patrick C. Alguire, Understanding Capitation, AM. COLL. PHYSICIANS
(2014), http://www.acponline.org/residents_fellows/career_counseling/under
standcapit.htm [http://perma.cc/T9JM-YACR].
143
See STARR, supra note 25, at 301–06. The first criminal prosecution of
health care providers under the Sherman Act involved a physician boycott of a
prepaid health plan in Washington, D.C. See AMA v. United States, 317 U.S. 519
(1943).
144
See generally DAVID BLUMENTHAL & JAMES A. MORONE, THE HEART OF POWER:
HEALTH AND POLITICS IN THE OVAL OFFICE 227 (2009) (reviewing health policy and the
presidency). To both moderate Republicans and the centrist Democrats who succeeded them, “managed competition” among private health plans of the Kaiser
variety seemed a promising free-enterprise alternative to European-style singlepayer systems.
145
See PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 191–96 (7th ed. 2012).
146
See id.
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and may not even track the “reimbursable claims” so beloved
by non-HMO commercial insurers and health care providers.
On the other hand, HMOs of this type are difficult to launch
where they do not already exist, and a geographic market that
consists only of such large organizations will almost certainly
be concentrated in antitrust terms.
From the perspective of acute care hospitals, managed care
in the 1990s was an additional source of financial pressure
that prompted the deployment of various business strategies,
including the affiliation of previously independent hospitals
into larger systems that could share management, reduce the
number of governing boards, market themselves more effectively, pursue economies of scale, and engage in group
purchasing of supplies.147 Undoubtedly, many transactions
were intended to improve hospitals’ economic clout, but most
of them, given the mood of the time, were undertaken as adaptive strategies rather than exploitative ones.148 For the first
time since the 1960s, for-profit hospitals were again major
market participants, putting the larger, more established community hospitals on the defensive.149 Several nonprofit Blue
Cross plans and a few prominent nonprofit hospitals converted
to for-profit status also, and a variety of entrepreneurial intermediaries entered the fray, sensing the upside potential
from showing rapid revenue growth during a stock market
boom.150 Even Columbia-HCA and the other for-profit hospital
mega-chains were motivated by things besides market power,
primarily capturing investors and increasing share value
through rapid growth.151
147

See AMERINGER, supra note 28, at 156–57.
See id.
149
See id.
150
See id. at 156–59.
151
Columbia-HCA, which became the largest hospital company in the United
States, started its rapid expansion by acquiring panicked facilities in over-bedded
markets, but it eventually turned to fraudulent billing and accounting practices
and shady arrangements with referring physicians. See Jeff Goldsmith, Columbia/HCA: A Failure of Leadership, 17 HEALTH AFF. 27–29 (1998). One can tell a
similar story about physician services during this period, emphasizing physicianhospital organizations that were launched to contract jointly with insurers, defensive efforts by hospitals to acquire primary care practices and assure patient
referrals, and for-profit physician practice management companies seeking to
impress Wall Street. See David Hemenway et al., Physicians’ Responses to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a For-Profit Ambulatory Care Center, 322 NEW ENG.
J. MEDICINE 1059, 1059–63 (1990) (analyzing Health Stop, a for-profit ambulatory
management company, which utilized financial incentives for physicians to increase revenues); Robert Kocher & Nikhil R. Sahni, Hospitals’ Race to Employ
Physicians—The Logic behind a Money-Losing Proposition, NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE
148
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Managed care, however, found it harder than expected to
alter clinical behavior in a system so committed to unassembled products, so thoroughly rooted in physician control, and
so devoid of objective accountability. Most managed care organizations did not attempt to reconfigure health care directly but
instead tried to reset the health care system’s financial incentives by shifting the financial risk of overutilizing services from
insurers to providers.152 The centerpiece of this effort, physician capitation, proved particularly difficult to implement.153
In a health care system accustomed to piecemeal payment for
unassembled products, physicians who had learned to keep
their appointment books full and to churn patients through
RVUs were challenged to distinguish essential from nonessential care.154 Even physicians who could manage their own care
processes effectively were neither organizationally nor financially prepared to assume responsibility for all the inputs that
they had previously “ordered” on someone else’s account.155
A regulatory backlash further discouraged managed care
from radically remaking American medicine. The general public had no interest in allowing “evil HMOs” to tell their doctors
what to do (and, more importantly, what not to do) should they
become seriously ill, while a general economic recovery took
some of the pressure off cost containment as a consumer concern.156 Congress and state legislatures responded to popular
fears through regressive legislation that restricted the tools of
managed care.157 Denominated “patient protection acts,”
these laws mainly sheltered physicians and hospitals from
competitive pressure.158 Several states even adopted “any
willing provider” or “freedom of choice” laws, which limited the
ability of managed care organizations to develop and manage
narrow provider networks.159
1790, 1790–91 (2011) (explaining that hospitals in the 1990s acquired primary
care practices to assure patient referrals to their respective hospitals).
152
See FELDSTEIN, supra note 145, at 192–93; Samuel H. Zuvekas & Joel W.
Cohen, Paying Physicians by Capitation: Is the Past Now Prologue?, 29 HEALTH
AFF. 1661, 1661 (2010).
153
See Zuvekas & Cohen, supra note 152, at 1666 (describing the history of
physician capitation in the 1980s and 1990s and its failure).
154
See generally FELDSTEIN, supra note 145, at 194–96 (explaining the benefits
and drawbacks of physician capitation payments).
155
See id.
156
AMERINGER, supra note 28, at 177–84.
157
See id. at 180–81.
158
See id. at 173–74.
159
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407 (West 2008) (“No hospital, physician
or type of provider . . . willing to meet the terms and conditions offered to it or him
shall be excluded.”); ALA. CODE § 27-45-3 (1988) (“No health insurance policy or
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Once managed care was hamstrung, insurers retreated to
business strategies that aroused less public controversy than a
frontal assault on wasteful treatment. Rather than be seen as
limiting choice and rationing care, for example, health insurers
began signing contracts with all the hospitals (and nearly all
the physicians) in each community and negotiated “discounted” rates for their services.160 Blue Cross plans—the
Oldsmobiles of health insurance—were suddenly back “in”;
highly selective HMOs were “out.”161 Large hospitals, many of
which had been considered moribund or at least fungible in a
managed care world focused on prevention and ambulatory
care, found themselves again in control, outpacing both insurers and physicians in both organizational strength and financial wherewithal.162 Private employers who sponsored health
coverage were appeased by shifting more costs to beneficiaries,
which proved easier (and less visible) than actually managing
care.163
What remained after the political dust settled was a fauxcompetitive market in which each private insurer negotiated
fees with every hospital and nearly every physician in their
geographic regions but did little else to reduce cost or improve
quality. Correspondingly, the main goal of providers became to
hold their own in these negotiations. Criticizing this minimally
managed style of managed care, one physician-health policy
expert quoted ironically from a letter he had recently received
from a California health insurer, welcoming him to its “carefully selected panel of more than 300 hospitals and 21,000
physicians.”164 These broad, overlapping networks of providers agreed to accept specified prices for unassembled services,
or to make percentage concessions from reportedly standard
charges that nobody actually paid.165 A hospital admission
employee benefit plan . . . shall . . . [p]revent any person who is a party to or
beneficiary of any such health insurance policy or employee benefit plan from
selecting the pharmacy or pharmacist of his choice . . . .”). For a discussion of the
evolution of “any willing provider” and “freedom of choice” laws, see Fred J. Hellinger, Any-Willing-Provider and Freedom-of-Choice Laws: An Economic Assessment, 14 HEALTH AFF. 297 (1995).
160
See discussion infra subsection III.B.1(d).
161
See FELDSTEIN, supra note 145, at 207–08.
162
See id. at 301–02.
163
See id. at 190–91.
164
Robert A. Berenson, Beyond Competition, 16 HEALTH AFF. 171, 176 (1997)
(“The alignment between health plans and providers envisioned in managed competition is virtually impossible.”).
165
Lisa Kinney Helvin, Note, Caring for the Uninsured: Are Not-for-Profit Hospitals Doing Their Share?, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 423–24 (2008) (noting
that hospitals often charge the poorest patients the highest rates for services).
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remained a “blank check” experience, with insurers paying
heavily discounted rates for a seemingly endless list of arbitrarily priced items appearing on the final bill and patients bearing
significant residual costs.166
By the turn of the millennium, contractual bargaining over
discounted fees was the principal accomplishment that the
managed care industry could trumpet to a still skeptical public. Contracts for disaggregated hospital services give insurers
somewhat greater predictability regarding cost than would indemnity reimbursement, but they do little to promote efficiency
in care delivery. Although proponents of managed care continued to tout its potential benefits, the poster children for its
success were HMOs such as Kaiser with shared values, stable
patient populations, and solid capital assets—attributes not
easily exported or grown to scale elsewhere.167 All in all, this
was a disappointing end to a decade that had begun with high
hopes of expanded access, reduced cost growth, and better
overall quality of care. One commentator neatly summed up
the competitive payoff to managed care by asking: “Is that all
there is?”168
B. Managed Care and Hospital Mergers
Former Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once
quipped that the sole consistency he could detect in litigation
under section 7 of the Clayton Act was that the government
always won.169 From the late 1980s through the early 2000s,
166

See Fuse Brown, supra note 7, at 15–20, 40–41.
See generally GEORGE C. HALVORSON & GEORGE J. ISHAM, EPIDEMIC OF CARE: A
CALL FOR SAFER, BETTER, AND MORE ACCOUNTABLE HEALTH CARE (2003) (calling for
more integrated care through HMOs).
168
Robert A. Berenson, Market Competition—Is That All There Is?, 22 HEALTH
AFF. 274 (2003) (reviewing HALVORSON & ISHAM, supra note 167). When the economic boom of the 1990s and early 2000s eventually slowed and reversed, broadnetwork HMO products with minimal cost-sharing—which were common in the
late 1990s—became unaffordable and, in most markets, unavailable. Only sharp
increases in deductibles and copayments prevented PPO-based insurance products from suffering a similar fate. More recently, narrow-network HMOs in which
care is more tightly managed seem to be making a comeback, a trend that reduces
the bargaining power of hospitals except in true monopoly markets. This newer
generation of managed care plans also includes intermediate forms, such as
tiered networks with differential cost sharing. David H. Howard, Adverse Effects
of Prohibiting Narrow Provider Networks, 371 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 591 (2014)
(discussing new network structures).
169
United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (action by United States to enjoin acquisition by one grocery company
of its direct competitor, even though neither has a large market share).
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the DOJ and FTC unexpectedly lost seven consecutive challenges to hospital mergers.170
The government brought cases that fit its horizontal
merger guidelines neatly, and anticompetitive effects seemed
readily provable using established metrics.171 Because hospitals are large, complex institutions, proposed mergers in many
communities tended to be associated with both high premerger HHIs and large potential HHI increases if four hospitals
became three or three became two.172 There are often no substitutes for hospitalization, and patients can travel only so far
when seriously ill. Hospitals are hard to build or move, creating barriers to entry by new competitors.173 Finally, the arguments that community hospitals made in defense of
consolidation, such as their service to the poor and their desire
to avoid duplicating expensive services (often called a “medical
arms race”), fell outside the economic frame that is supposed to
govern merger analysis and therefore seemed not to be cognizable in court.174
Why, then, did the government lose so consistently? Although the hospital mergers challenged by the government
170
See Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. FTC., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999) (Poplar
Bluff, MO) (FTC and state of Missouri unsuccessfully sought to enjoin merger of
two hospitals); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (N.D. Cal.
2000), aff’d, 217 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2000) (Oakland, CA) (state of California
unsuccessfully brought suit against two hospitals, claiming that proposed merger
would have anticompetitive effect); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr.,
983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (Nassau County, NY) (government unsuccessfully sought to enjoin merger of two not-for-profit “anchor hospitals”); FTC. v.
Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (Grand Rapids,
MI) (FTC unsuccessfully sought preliminary injunction to prevent merger of two
hospitals); United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa
1995), vacated as moot, 107 F.3D 632 (8th Cir. 1997) (Dubuque, IA) (government
unsuccessfully brought antitrust action against two hospitals to enjoin proposed
merger); FTC. v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69
F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995) (Joplin, MO) (FTC unsuccessfully filed motion for preliminary injunction seeking to prohibit consolidation of hospitals pending resolution
of administrative proceedings as to legality of consolidation); FTC v. Hosp. Bd. of
Dirs. of Lee County, No. 94–137–CIV–FTM–25D, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19770
(M.D. Fla. May 16, 1994), aff’d, 38 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1994) (Lee County, FL)
(FTC unsuccessfully filed complaint to prevent county hospital board’s proposed
purchase of private hospital in county, alleging that purchase would be anticompetitive in violation of Clayton Act).
171
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES § 3 (1984), http://
www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11249.htm [http://perma.cc/QQ3S-YH5K?type=
source] (horizontal merger guidelines in 1984).
172
Id. § 3.1 Concentration and Market Shares (discussing the HerfindahlHirschman Index).
173
Id. § 4.131 Market Concentration (discussing barriers to entry).
174
Id. § 2.12 Relevant Evidence (discussing types of evidence used in merger
analysis).
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conveyed a clear picture of illegality when seen from the economics-driven middle ground of conventional merger analysis,
the image evaporated both higher up and lower down. From
the high ground, the cases seemed backwards. In the prevailing narrative of the time, nonprofit hospitals were good guys
even if they happened to be sellers, managed care organizations were bad guys even if they happened to be buyers, and
the government should not help the latter exploit the former.175
Down in the weeds, within “markets” that were really communities, the merging hospitals enjoyed a high degree of trust,
including from prominent businesspeople who sat on their governing boards and who were also buyers of hospital services for
their workers.176 In one case, the proposed merger was undertaken partially in response to the recommendations from a
formal community-based needs assessment, an overhang of
1970s-style health planning that did not confer formal immunity under antitrust law but that nevertheless evidenced the
good citizenship of the hospitals.177
Moreover, in the much less sophisticated market that existed then for economic expertise in antitrust litigation, defendants were able to create enough noise in the data to disrupt the
evidentiary base needed to find anticompetitive effect.178 In
particular, geographic markets turned out to be surprisingly
malleable,179 especially when judges and juries were sympa175
See, e.g., Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1302 (“In the real
world, hospitals are in the business of saving lives, and managed care organizations are in the business of saving dollars.”).
176
See, e.g., id. at 1296 (detailing defendant hospitals’ argument that “nonprofit hospitals do not operate in the same manner as profit maximizing businesses,” as nonprofit hospital boards “are comprised of community business
leaders who have a direct stake in maintaining high quality, low cost hospital
services”); FTC. v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1222–23 (W.D. Mo. 1995),
aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining that because the combined Board is
composed primarily of persons who “indirectly represent the interests of hospital
consumers . . . it would not be in these individual Board member’s best economic
interest to permit prices to be raised beyond a normal competitive level”). Even
large insurers could be complacent, allowing courts to infer that competitive harm
was unlikely. United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121,
132 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting the CEO of a major New York insurer as admitting
that the merging hospitals were “doing exactly what they should do . . . [to] enable
them to deliver a better health care product . . . [and] a much more cost effective
system.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)) .
177
Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1289.
178
See id. at 1302–03 (“The Court, . . . having duly considered the voluminous
exhibits introduced by the parties, . . . concludes that defendants have persuasively rebutted not only the FTC’s prima facie case but also the FTC’s additional
evidence of anticompetitive effect.”).
179
Tenet Health Care Corp. v. FTC, 186 F.3d 1045, 1051–54 (8th Cir. 1999);
Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 140–43.
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thetic toward the merging parties, and even substantial increases in concentration were interpreted as harmless to
consumers using the analytic methods then in vogue.180
The prosecutorial failures of the 1990s did not sit well with
the FTC and DOJ. During the 2000s, while the government’s
litigators were licking their wounds and very little of interest
was happening in the delivery of health care, agency economists and academic researchers studied both the markets involved in these cases and the more general relationship
between provider consolidation and price/quality characteristics. This research was collected and analyzed by a Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation initiative called the Synthesis Project, which published a report in 2006 and an update in
2012.181 The Synthesis Project concluded that less competitive
hospital markets have higher prices and may have lower quality.182 Moreover, there was no relationship between the fee-forservice prices charged by hospitals and their status as charitable or proprietary entities.183 In fact nonprofit hospitals as well
as for-profit hospitals acquired and exercised market power to
the detriment of consumers.184
The narrative of good and evil changed as well, reinforcing
the agencies’ commitment to hospital merger enforcement.
Managed care had been defanged, and it was no longer considered a public menace. With health care costs continuing to rise
and large hospitals seemingly contemptuous of real-world eco180
See Kenneth G. Elzinga & Anthony W. Swishier, Limits of the ElzingaHogarty Test in Hospital Mergers: The Evanston Case, 18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 133,
142–43 (2011); Cory S. Capps et al., The Silent Majority Fallacy of the ElzingaHogarty Criteria: A Critique and New Approach to Analyzing Hospital Mergers
27–29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8216, 2001) (predicting the increase in price that various mergers would generate and concluding
some hospital mergers could lead to significant price increases); see also Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1295 (describing studies conducted by the
defendant’s economic expert, Dr. William J. Lynk, which found that higher hospital concentration benefits consumers by decreasing nonprofit hospital prices).
181
See GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 17 (studying why the rapid consolidation of
hospitals occurred and what impact it had on the price and quality for patients,
and the cost of care for hospitals); VOGT & TOWN, supra note 19.
182
GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 19, at 1.
183
David Dranove & Richard Ludwick, Competition and Pricing by Nonprofit
Hospitals: A Reassessment of Lynk’s Analysis, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 87, 97 (1999)
(concluding that prices charged by nonprofit and for-profit hospitals post-merger
are similar).
184
Emmett B. Keeler et. al, The Changing Effects of Competition on Non-profit
and For-Profit Hospital Pricing Behavior, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 69, 69, 83 (1999)
(study showing “the association of hospital prices with measures of market concentration changed steadily [from 1986–94], with prices [at the end of the study]
higher in less competitive areas, even for non-profit hospitals”).
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nomic constraints, providers that were the apparent victims
twenty years ago saw their reputations tarnished and their
business deals scrutinized once again. A series of reports by
the Attorney General’s Office in Massachusetts, for example,
blamed hospitals—including several world-famous institutions—for charging arbitrary and exorbitant prices.185 An outgrowth of Massachusetts’ enactment in 2006 of state-based
universal coverage, these documents presaged the current debate over provider consolidation as the ACA is implemented
nationwide.
At the same time, the FTC and DOJ began reinvestigating
past transactions and reinvigorating enforcement procedures.
The legal payoff from renewed enforcement has been substantial, with the agencies successfully halting or unwinding several recent hospital mergers.186 Following its re-analysis of the
Evanston, Illinois, market, for example, FTC staff filed an administrative action to challenge a transaction there five years
after it had been consummated.187 In 2005, an administrative
law judge concluded that the merger should be unwound.188
More recently, the FTC succeeded in obtaining both a preliminary injunction in federal district court and an ALJ determination of anticompetitive effect in connection with a hospital
merger in Toledo, Ohio, and a preliminary injunction against a
proposed merger in Rockford, Illinois.189
C. Preparing to Fight the Last War: Merger Policy and the
ACA
The tide may have turned once again in favor of close scrutiny of hospital consolidation, but recent merger enforcement
continues to view hospital markets largely through a late 1990s
185

MASS. ATT’Y GEN.’S OFFICE, supra note 76, at 1, 19.
In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp. & ENH Med. Group, Inc.,
No. 9315, 144 F.T.C. 1, 521–23 (Aug. 2, 2007) (Evanston, IL); FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1095 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Rockford, IL); FTC v.
ProMedica Health Sys., No. 3:11 CV 47, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33434, at *50 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 29, 2011) (Toledo, OH).
187
Complaint at 1, In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., (No. 9315),
2005 WL 2845790 (F.T.C.) (Feb. 10, 2004).
188
In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., 2005 WL 2845790, at
*177–78 (F.T.C.) (Oct. 20, 2005). On review, the full Commission agreed the
merger was anticompetitive but declined to order divestiture. In re Evanston
Northwestern Healthcare Corp., 2007 WL 2286195, at *78–79 (F.T.C.) (Aug. 6,
2007).
189
FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1095 (N.D. Ill. 2012);
FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., No 3:11–CV–47, 2011 WL 1219281, at *50 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 29, 2011); In re ProMedica Health System Inc., F.T.C. No. 9346 (Dec.
12, 2011).
186
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lens. To the enforcement agencies, intervention in hospital
mergers is still justified primarily by the belief that the merged
hospitals will increase their negotiating clout vis-à-vis insurers, not by concern over output restriction and deadweight
loss, or even managerial slack, that traditionally comprise the
chief harms from market power.190
Current agency guidance bases enforcement decisions on a
model of “two-stage competition” in hospital markets. First,
hospitals bargain over the terms of inclusion in insurers’ networks; second, insured patients choose among contract facilities for specific services.191 The two-stage construct, however,
is a compromise that emerged from the regulatory backlash
against managed care in the late 1990s, which discouraged
selective contracting and tightly managed care, and normalized
broad networks that promise enrollees negotiated prices for
covered but unmanaged services.192 Perpetuating such a stylized, effete form of managed care is hardly a compelling rationale for hostility to provider consolidation among antitrust
enforcers.
The Synthesis Project, for example, was a product of its
time, and speaks mainly to the effects of health care consolidation between the Clinton administration’s health care reform
effort in 1993–94 and the passage of the ACA in 2010.193 Few
of the studies it collected demonstrated specific benefits from
lack of hospital consolidation beyond the routine ascription of
increased consumer welfare to reduced prices for disaggregated
services.194 As the Institute of Medicine and others have explained, American health care is so routinely wasteful that it is
difficult to regard small pricing changes alone as evidence of
substantial improvement.195
190
In its successful enforcement action in Rockford, Illinois, for example, the
FTC argued that “the merger would still harm competition . . . as health plans
would have greater leverage playing three hospital systems off one another rather
than merely two.” Plaintiff’s Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 8, F.T.C. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d
1069 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (No. 11 C 50344).
191
Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 673–74 (2000).
192
See Paul B. Ginsburg, Competition in Health Care: Its Evolution Over the
Past Decade, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1512, 1516–17 (2005).
193
See GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 17; VOGT & TOWN, supra note 19.
194
See GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 17, at 6; VOGT & TOWN, supra note 19, at
8–9.
195
INST. OF MED., supra note 21, at 99–105 (estimating annual healthcare
waste to be at $750 billion). For a skeptical view about understanding competition based on merger retrospective studies, see Gregory J. Werden, Inconvenient
Truths on Merger Retrospective Studies 19 (Jan. 5, 2015) (unpublished working
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Moreover, the enforcement agencies may be inventing
problems in markets that happen to be easy to evaluate instead
of evaluating markets that have the biggest problems.196 Price
discounting became ubiquitous among hospitals because so
many had been built in response to decades of government
subsidies and cost-unconscious insurance payment practices.197 In particular, hospital beds proliferated in small and
medium-sized geographic markets, which is where the enforcement agencies tend to concentrate their merger prevention efforts.198 Without Hill-Burton funds, tax-exempt bond
financing, Medicare cost-plus and capital cost reimbursement,
and other nonmarket supports, these communities would have
built fewer and smaller hospitals to begin with.199 Even after
hospital consolidation, there is no evidence that these communities are a major source of waste and inefficiency in health
care or that hospitals in larger cities systematically outperform
them.
An additional challenge is that the analytic methods currently in vogue depend almost entirely on historical patterns to
predict the competitive outcomes of hospital mergers.200 This
may be appropriate in times of relative stability, but it is hazardous when the regulatory determinants of health care markets are undergoing rapid change. In the Marshfield Clinic
case, then Chief Judge Posner justified the defendant’s size
and scope on the grounds that smaller providers would be
paper), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2545343 [http://
perma.cc/6297-5LTV].
196
It will usually be possible to show high market shares and large changes in
concentration whenever one in three or one in four hospitals ceases to operate as
an independent business. Under the Merger Guidelines, virtually any merger
involving competitors in a market with four hospitals or less would be “presumptively unlawful.” See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 171, §§ 4–5.
197
See Comment, The Hill-Burton Act, 1946–1980: Asynchrony in the Delivery
of Health Care to the Poor, 39 MD. L. REV. 316, 324 (1979) [hereinafter “The HillBurton Act”].
198
See Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Critical Issues in Hospital Antitrust Law, 22 HEALTH AFF. 88, 89 (2003). The federal enforcement agencies refrain
from challenging the great majority of merger and acquisition transactions that
occur each year. In 2013, the Agencies were notified of 1326 total mergers or
acquisitions across all industries (the FTC challenged 23 and DOJ challenged 15).
Of 59 transactions involving health care services of which they were notified, the
government challenged three. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HARTSCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013 (2014), http://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/reports/36th-report-fy2013/140521hsrreport.pdf
[http://perma.cc/M9F5-K68X].
199
See The Hill-Burton Act, supra note 197, at 324.
200
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES (2010), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy
/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/32RW-D2ED].
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“competing to provide horse-and-buggy medicine.”201 Similarly, a standalone hospital today that is unable to combine its
services with those of physicians or adopt new organizational
structures and information systems would be competing to
provide overly expensive, insufficiently effective “twentieth century medicine,” not the high-quality, cost-effective health care
needed in the twenty-first century.
Basing enforcement priorities on predictive models that
rely so heavily on past conditions is likely to be misleading at
best, and at worst to cause substantial harm by chilling productive innovation. The United States is now experiencing another discontinuity in regulation and payment, with profound
implications for health care markets.202 Much as government
has heavily influenced market structure, conduct, and performance in the past, changes in regulation will influence future competitive outcomes as the ACA is implemented.203
From one perspective, the ACA was narrowly partisan legislation. From another perspective, the ACA was an extraordinary achievement—the successful culmination of a 100-year
effort to universalize health coverage in the United States.204
Its passage after decades of political and policy failure completed the New Deal pledge of solidarity in the face of adversity
and finally brought the United States into the company of the
world’s other developed nations, all of which make health insurance universally available to their citizens.
201
Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1412
(7th Cir. 1995).
202
See Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1540–41 (1984).
203
The FTC has cautioned in its public statements not to “ignore the lessons
of the last quarter century” regarding market power and health care costs. Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11
(2010) (statement of Richard A. Feinstein, Dir. of the Bureau of Competition, Fed.
Trade Comm’n) [hereinafter “Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care Industry”].
204
The first attempt to bring the U.S. health policy more in line with the
progressive social democracies of Western Europe was Theodore Roosevelt’s 1912
campaign as the presidential nominee of the “Bull Moose” party. Brian Palmer,
Obama Says Theodore Roosevelt Lobbied for Health Care Reform, SLATE (Mar. 9,
2010, 4:46 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/
2010/03/obama_says_theodore_roosevelt_lobbied_for_health_care_reform_.html
[http://perma.cc/PP9Q-DG22]. These efforts were renewed by every subsequent
Democratic administration and some Republican ones, culminating in the
landmark 1965 enactment of Medicare and Medicaid as a medical safety net for
the elderly and indigent. See BLUMENTHAL & MORONE, supra note 144 (exploring
how modern presidents approached the politics of health care and health care
reform).
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Although its insurance reforms remain controversial in today’s political environment, the ACA solves on paper the two
problems that most had limited Americans’ health coverage:
uninsurability based on health status and inability to afford
insurance.205 But that is not all. The ACA’s true breakthrough
is its ambition also to address the inefficiency of health care
delivery and the nation’s poor underlying health.206 The ACA
adheres closely to the established path for U.S. health reform,
“managed competition,” to accomplish these goals, implying
that competition must do better in the future than in the
past.207 A principal objective of managed competition, strongly
evident in the ACA, is to channel insurers into competing on
the care they deliver rather than the actuarial risk they bear.208
Managed competition is not synonymous with managed
care, but proposals to universalize private health insurance
205
The ACA addresses the former problem by simultaneously prohibiting insurance companies from rejecting or surcharging applicants because of their
health and penalizing individuals who still fail to become insured. The ACA addresses the latter problem by providing tax subsidies to working-class Americans
and by giving states generous financial assistance to make Medicaid available to
all citizens with income near or below the federal poverty line. Sage, supra note
133, at 1082–83.
206
Id. at 1082–85. The Institute for Healthcare Improvement, a pioneer in
medical quality and safety, has challenged the health care system to pursue a
“Triple Aim” of improving the patients’ experience of care, improving the health of
populations, and reducing per capita cost. INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, IHI
TRIPLE AIM INITIATIVE (2015), http://www.ihi.org/Engage/Initiatives/TripleAim/
pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/3XX3-EE5V].
207
Thomas L. Greaney, The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy: Antidote or Placebo?, 89 OR. L. REV. 811, 816–17, 826 (2011). “[M]anaged competition” is most closely associated with the Clinton administration’s failed Health
Security Act. Sage, supra note 133, at 1088. In “single-payer” systems, government acts as sole insurer and pays health care providers directly for covered
services, usually at administratively determined rather than competitive rates.
Under “managed competition,” by contrast, government structures and monitors
competition among private health insurers to deliver covered services at market
prices. Id. at 1089; see Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice
Health Plan for the 1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to
Promote Quality and Economy (First of Two Parts), 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 29, 34–35
(1989); Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the
1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and
Economy (Second of Two Parts), 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 94, 99–100 (1989).
208
Sage, supra note 133, at 1090. The ACA mandates the establishment of
public health insurance exchanges across the country to broker coverage for
individuals and small employers. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 1311, 124 Stat. 173 (2010). Insurers participating in
these exchanges operate under very different rules from traditional health plans,
including offering standardized benefits and complying with a blanket prohibition
on medical underwriting. Id. § 1302 (outlining essential health benefits); id.
§ 1201 (prohibiting underwriting based on preexisting conditions). The ACA also
creates significant incentives to create or expand “private exchanges” not limited
to a single employer, which are subject to slightly different rules. Id. § 1311–12.
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have generally contemplated a leading role for “good” managed
care organizations that improve the cost-effectiveness of health
care delivery.209 The ACA takes a similar approach, looking to
organized systems of care that are publicly accountable for
quality as well as cost.210 Some of these are likely to be true
HMOs such as Kaiser, while others will be conventional health
insurers responding to the ACA’s changed incentives, and still
others will be experimental forms of health care delivery such
as ACOs and PCMHs.211
The ACA also offers a framework for a new vision of competition based on clinical outcomes and value-for-money, employing a variety of tools to change how physicians, hospitals,
and insurers do business.212 For hospital care, these include
strong inducements, both financial and organizational, to
avoid expensive inpatient care and, if it becomes necessary, to
provide it as safely and cost-effectively as possible.213 For example, in combination with the Medicare program’s related
commitment to ACOs and medical homes, the ACA shifts payment models away from professional piecework, and toward
bundled or global payment for measurable improvements in
health outcomes.214 CMS directives also call for greater coordination among hospitals, physicians and ancillary care provid209

Sage, supra note 133, at 1091.
See Terry L. Corbett, Healthcare Corporate Structure and the ACA: A Need
for Mission Primacy Through a New Organizational Paradigm?, 12 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 103, 165–66 (2015).
211
For a comparison of various types of organized systems of care see AM.
HOSP. ASS’N, ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORG.: AHA RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT 4–5 (2010).
212
Among those changes are the following: (i) Essential Health Benefits, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 1302, 124 Stat.
119 (2010); (ii) zero cost sharing for US Preventive Services Task Force A- or Brated services, id. § 4003; (iii) the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute
(PCORI) (comparative effectiveness research), id. § 6301; (iv) the Independent
Medicare Advisory Board, id. §§ 3403, 10320; (v) Accountable Care Organizations
(Medicare Shared Savings Program), id. § 3022, (vi) Patient-Centered Health
Homes (Medicaid), id. § 2703; (vii) bundled (episodic) payment pilot program for
acute and post-acute care, id. § 3023; (viii) the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Innovation (CMI) to test new, budget-neutral models for care delivery and provider
payment, id. § 3141, (ix) the hospital value-based purchasing program (Medicare
pay-for-performance), id. § 10326, (x) an expanded Medicare hospital quality reporting system, id. § 3001; (xi) an expanded Medicare physician quality reporting
system, id. § 3002; and (xii) the Independence at Home Demonstration Program to
avoid hospitalization (Medicare), id. § 3024.
213
Id. § 3025 (detailing the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, which
requires CMS to reduce DRG payments for Inpatient Prospective Payment System
(IPPS) hospitals with excessive readmissions).
214
On January 26, 2015, the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services announced that Medicare would pursue an aggressive transition
from fee-for-service to other forms of provider payment. See U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., supra note 37.
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ers to meet demand for health promotion, disease prevention,
chronic care management, and successful treatment of illness.215 Hospitals will only be able to deliver and receive compensation for these more coherent products if they can
measure and report both their own performance and the performance of their partners and affiliates, including physicians
and other health professionals.216
Provider consolidation today therefore represents a renewed search for efficient scope and scale not seen since the
early 1980s, when the introduction of Medicare DRGs shocked
hospitals into rethinking their business models.217 Even taking the efficiency claims of merging parties with a large grain of
salt, restructuring may enable hospitals to more accurately
assess their costs and outcomes, offer services jointly with physicians and other providers, and accept new forms of payment
that reward productive efficiency instead of billable volume.
Advances consequent to restructuring might even include improvements in safety and quality that ultimately reduce the
need for additional medical services. Given these pressures
and expectations, forcing provider markets to remain artifi215
See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3022 (establishing
the Medicare Shared Savings Program for Accountable Care Organizations).
Drawing from the “Triple Aim,” the three overarching goals of the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for Accountable Care Organizations are to
enable (i) better care for individuals, (ii) better health for populations, and (iii)
lower growth in Medicare Parts A and B expenditures. See Medicare Program;
Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg.
67,802, 67,803 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425). CMS has also
established the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation, which will test innovative payment and delivery models in order to lower costs and enhance quality of
care. Stuart Guterman et al., Innovation in Medicare and Medicaid Will Be Central
to Health Reform’s Success, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1188, 1188–89 (2010).
216
For example, section 3025 of the ACA implements the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, which decreases Medicare DRG payments for certain
hospitals with high readmissions rates. Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act § 3025. The Affordable Care Act also expands the use of pay-for-performance
initiatives in Medicare. Id. § 10326.
217
See David Dranove, Viewing Health Care Consolidation Through the Lens of
the Economics of Strategy, in ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION CHANGES IN
HEALTHCARE FINANCING AND ORGANIZATION REPORT 2–3 (2010), https://
www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/HCFOReportMarch2010.pdf [http://
perma.cc/73HY-JY8Z] (noting that hospitals claim mergers bring much-needed
efficiencies and prevent cost-increasing medical arms’ races). However, hospital
consolidation since the 1990s has almost always been limited to the corporate
shell. Very few facilities actually have been closed or downsized, which also
suggests that consolidated hospitals seldom reduce output as would a classic
monopolist. See Kathryn Saenz Duke, Hospitals in a Changing Health Care System, 15 HEALTH AFF. 49, 54 (1996). This departure from the conventional economics of market power provides additional support for the idea that health care
products are unlike products elsewhere in the economy.
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cially fragmented may actually reduce competing providers’ incentives and ability to improve their products. For example,
providers in more concentrated markets may be better able to
invest in community health and disease prevention, which are
essential to long-term cost control.
The tension between old-market and new-market perspectives is evident in a recent judicial decision involving a hospital
merger or acquisition, FTC v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd.218
In St. Luke’s, the federal government and the state of Idaho
sued a Boise hospital system that had acquired a physician
group practice in the adjoining community of Nampa, where
the hospital already had an inpatient facility.219 After a hearing, a federal judge ordered the hospital to divest itself of the
acquired physicians, finding that the transaction had increased the hospital’s bargaining leverage with health insurers
in the market for “primary care physician” services.220 The
judge also concluded that the acquisition would increase prices
for certain diagnostic services ordered by the newly affiliated
physicians because the hospital would be able to apply more
lucrative billing codes associated with hospital-based care.221
At the same time, however, the judge praised the hospital
for preparing to compete in a post-ACA environment in which
payment will be based on patient outcomes rather than the
volume of services.222 “In a world that was not governed by the
Clayton Act,” he wrote, “the best result might be to approve the
Acquisition and . . . see if the predicted price increases actually
occurred. . . . But the Clayton Act . . . does not give the Court
discretion to . . . conduct a health care experiment.”223
Indeed, keeping physicians economically independent of
hospitals is not a desirable policy over the long term. Similarly,
a market for primary care physician services should lose its
coherence as other professionals and other modalities become
available to provide basic medical care.224 At the same time,
Medicare should, and undoubtedly will, change its rules re218
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, FTC v. St. Luke’s Health System,
Ltd., 2014 WL 407446 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014) (No. 1:13–CV–00116–BLW), aff’d
sub nom. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd.,
778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015).
219
See Saint Alphonsus, 778 F.3d at 781–82.
220
See Memorandum Decision & Order at 3–4, FTC v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd., No. 1:13–CV–00116–BLW (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014).
221
See Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, supra note 218, ¶¶ 124–25.
222
See id. ¶ 149.
223
Id. ¶¶ 76–77.
224
See, e.g., Daniel McCarthy, Note, The Virtual Economy: Telemedicine and
the Supply of Primary Care Physicians in Rural America, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 111,
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garding relative payment for hospital-based and nonhospital
outpatient services as the competitive landscape evolves.225
Admittedly, enthusiasm for productive change may fade if
politics intervenes, fatigue sets in, another economic bubble
begins, or interest in continued reform is eclipsed by other,
more pressing national concerns. But it would be a serious
mistake for overzealous antitrust enforcement to turn the demise of delivery system reform into a self-fulfilling prophecy by
deterring private innovation or persuading regulators that
nothing else needs to be done. The last section of this Article
proposes a different approach, in which both antitrust enforcers and regulators work in concert to reorient the health care
system toward assembled products and the superior competitive outcomes that those products can offer.
III
TOWARD BETTER PRODUCTS: ALIGNING ANTITRUST WITH
REGULATORY CHANGE
The persistence of unassembled products in health care
poses a challenge for antitrust analysis because the economic
underpinnings of modern antitrust law—like many welfarist
calculations—tend to regard buyers’ preferences as exogenously determined and therefore incontestable.226 In an influential 1978 book, Robert Bork argued that the activist antitrust
law of the time paradoxically made markets less rather than
more efficient.227 The “Chicago School” of antitrust analysis
that arose in response was based on a reductionist notion, in
which enforcement is used sparingly and legal institutions rec112–13 (1995) (examining “telemedicine” as a method of providing basic medical
care to rural communities).
225
In fact, payment policy was altered after this Article was written. See
Medicare Program: Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Quality Reporting Programs, 80 Fed. Reg. 39,200 (July 8, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
410) (discussing a change to Medicare payment for nonhospital outpatient
services).
226
Compare Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 168 (1999) (analyzing cost-benefit analysis from legal,
economic, and philosophical perspectives), with RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4
(2009) (developing a theory of “libertarian paternalism” to overcome cognitive
biases).
227
ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 71 (1978) (arguing the original intent
of antitrust laws as well as economic efficiency make consumer welfare and the
protection of competition, rather than competitors, the only goals of antitrust
law).
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ognize their own limitations.228 It postulates that markets generate their own priorities, and that competition will occur along
the dimensions that consumers prefer.229 It also posits that
innovation and new entry will eventually overcome most
monopolies.230
Chicago School antitrust analysis therefore regards with
considerable skepticism the argument that the services that
consumers appear to want are not in fact the services that
health care providers should compete to deliver.231 The classic
judicial statement of this perspective, from the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Indiana Federation of Dentists v. FTC, is that a
group of professionals may not preempt “the working of the
market by deciding for itself that customers do not need that
which they demand,” which constitutes “nothing less than a
frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.”232
A weakness of the Chicago School approach is its relative
incompatibility with highly regulated industries, in which
neither baseline conditions nor trajectories of change necessarily follow market models. Public regulation coexists with competition in many industrial sectors,233 yet the interaction
between the two governance regimes has seldom been a focus
of competition policy. The most straightforward accommodations antitrust analysis makes to regulation—state action and
implied federal repeal—are not often available to guide enforcement.234 States seldom clearly articulate and actively supervise regulatory regimes that supplant competitive processes
(all-payer rate setting and certificate of need laws being vestig228
See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 925, 928 (1979) (criticizing government intervention in the economy).
229
See id. at 926.
230
See id. at 932–33.
231
See Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago’s Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law
in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 861 (2004) (noting that the Chicago School
is resistant to insights from other disciplines that call into question the core
assumption of neoclassical economics).
232
FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457, 462 (1986) (quoting
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978)) (holding
horizontal policy agreement among dental association members to withhold information requested by insurers to violate the Sherman Act).
233
See, e.g., Harvey L. Reiter, Competition Between Public and Private Distributors in a Restructured Power Industry, 19 ENERGY L.J. 333, 333–34 (1998) (discussing the impact of regulations on private sector energy distributors).
234
See Bobak Razavi, Harmonizing Antitrust Exemption Law: A Hybrid Approach to State Action and Implied Repeal, 9 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 6–7 (2009)
(discussing the implied repeal and state action accommodations to antitrust
regulation).
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ial counterexamples).235 Nor does Congress often deliberately
substitute federal regulation for marketplace competition (exclusivity rights for biomedical innovation being a persistent
counterexample).236
The neutrality that antitrust law scrupulously displays toward the objectives of competition in less regulated industries
is in significant tension with the wasteful production and allocation habits of the ostensibly competitive but underperforming U.S. health care system.237 Notably, if health care products
systematically lack market justification, antitrust enforcement
based on Chicago School principles will be at best a weak force
serving the public interest. Whether prices for unassembled
products are too high or quality too low in a particular case will
have less impact on overall consumer welfare than enabling
better products to emerge.238
This suggests that antitrust law should play a more directive role in health care, breaking down regulatory and habitual
barriers to market entry by new competitors offering better
value for money, and placing a thumb on the scale in dealing
with current competitors in favor of assembling today’s faux
products into more meaningful ones. The former strategy is
entirely compatible with prevailing thinking among antitrust
economists, although it takes a long-term view of broadening
competition through innovation. The latter strategy is more
controversial, but it seems a necessary supplement to antitrust
enforcement decisions in existing markets. To accomplish it,
antitrust law must develop analytics that anticipate future
competitive priorities in health care, integrating both market
and regulatory governance.
235
See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation, 67
HASTINGS L.J. 85, 96, 129 (2015) (noting that two-thirds of all states have certificate of need laws while only one state (Maryland) uses an all-payer rate setting
system).
236
See Henry G. Grabowski et al., The Roles of Patents and Research and
Development Incentives in Biopharmaceutical Innovation, 34 HEALTH AFF. 302
(2015) (arguing that patent protection helps encourage innovation in the market
for biomedicine).
237
See Tanya G.K. Bentley et al., Waste in the U.S. Health Care System: A
Conceptual Framework, 86 MILBANK Q. 629, 630 (2008) (contending that waste
arises in the U.S. health care system because system participants lack incentives
to economize).
238
The statement in Indiana Federation of Dentists was also less sweeping
than it might seem. At the time of the decision, antitrust enforcers had only just
begun to engage the professions. While the enforcers no longer turned a blind eye
to blatantly anticompetitive conduct such as price fixing, they remained deferential to the professional judgments and traditions that are constitutive of the health
care industry. See supra text accompanying note 217.
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How can antitrust law induce product improvement? This
section of the Article identifies priority areas for antitrust enforcement, such as deterring exclusionary conduct, discusses
the relationship between antitrust enforcers and regulators,
and proposes ways in which both groups of competition policymakers can collaborate in pursuit of better health care
products.
The ACA creates openings for antitrust enforcers and regulators to work in tandem to improve the outcomes of competition in health care, and the federal antitrust agencies are
already cooperating in this effort. The FTC delivered a prepared
statement in December 2010 to the Judiciary Committee of the
U.S. House of Representatives describing its intention to use
antitrust enforcement to drive health care reform by lowering
prices and fostering innovation through competition.239 Subsequently, both antitrust enforcement agencies collaborated
with Medicare on rules for the Shared Savings (ACO) Program
that attempt to harmonize competition analysis with evolving
federal regulation.240
A. Product-Enhancing Antitrust Analysis
If close scrutiny of merger transactions in medium-sized
communities is not likely to result in sustained public benefit
because it perpetuates an artificial bargaining process between
providers and insurers, what enforcement agenda might better
serve the goal of product improvement articulated by previous
sections of this Article? As a threshold matter, it is important
to consider the vocabulary and methods associated with antitrust analysis that bear on the question of using competition
policy to help move medical markets toward assembled
products.
1. Product Market Definition
Antitrust analysis typically defines a “product market” to
analyze the competitive effects of a proposed merger or other
challenged conduct.241 The product market includes the item
being sold and its plausible economic substitutes and excludes
239

Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care Industry, supra note 203, at 2.
FTC and Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared
Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026–32 (Oct. 28, 2011).
241
There is an ongoing debate over the importance of product market definition in merger analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 276–78.
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other things.242 One clue that disaggregated health care services may not be products in the usual economic sense is that
providers with apparent market power may charge higher
prices for each service but do not seem to restrict the volume of
services as would a classic monopolist or cartel facing a standard demand curve. Instead, health economists use terms like
“supplier-induced demand”243 and the “target-income hypothesis”244 to describe the ability of physicians, in almost any
market configuration, to deliver as many services as they
choose.245
In delimiting these markets, health care antitrust litigation
often finesses the question of how the skills of the providers
engaged in the transaction map onto the medical needs of patients—which is another indication that what we have labeled
products in health care are not products in the usual sense.
When two electronics manufacturers propose to merge, antitrust enforcers define a market for televisions, music players,
or computers—not for making blueprints, maintaining “clean
rooms,” or encasing electronic components in metal frames.246
However, it is the unusual antitrust case that defines a market
for “hip surgery” or “cancer treatment.”247
Admittedly, it would be impractical to measure a merger’s
effect on competition for each of thousands of billable
processes and inputs, or for each of hundreds of medical
problems. Enforcement agencies and courts therefore use umbrella terms such as “physician services,” “inpatient hospital
services,” “outpatient services,” “acute care services” and the
like.248 In recent litigation, for example, the FTC separated
242

See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
Supplier-induced demand occurs when an asymmetry of information
exists between supplier and consumer. FELDSTEIN, supra note 145, at 268–69.
244
The target income hypothesis suggests that a physician is motivated to
maintain a certain level of desired income and if their actual income falls below
this level, a physician will modify his behavior to restore income to the targeted
level. Id. at 269.
245
This short-term change in output is different from the longer-term changes
that occur when newly created diagnoses or therapies turn nonmedical problems
into medical ones or alter the risk-benefit calculus of seeking treatment rather
than remaining untreated, especially when health insurance moderates the financial consequences.
246
See, e.g., A.I. Root Co. v. Comput./Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 675 (6th
Cir. 1986) (defining a “small computer market” in an antitrust case involving
electronics manufacturers).
247
See, e.g., Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 212 (3d Cir. 2005)
(defining product markets for “general outpatient cataract surgery,” “general inpatient cataract surgery,” and “general emergency eye surgery”).
248
See Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, supra note 218, ¶ 49 (identifying the relevant product market as the market for “physician services”).
243
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markets for inpatient hospital services from markets for primary care physician services in alleging the likelihood of harm
to consumers from the merger of two hospitals with employed
physicians.249 This product definition has a superficial appeal
because of historical practices generating separate bills for professional and facility fees in both outpatient and inpatient settings. But it fails to capture the intent of Medicare’s new care
and payment models, which place a heavy emphasis on community-based prevention and management of chronic disease—the dominant source of medical need in the United
States today—to reduce the frequency of inpatient acute
care.250
In the short term, enforcers and courts are unlikely to shift
their approach to product markets in health care from one
based on producers or inputs to one based on assembled outputs. Over the longer term, however, they should be open to
doing so. As noted above, for example, the market for “primary
care physician” services defined in the St. Luke’s case may
become incoherent when consumers access basic medical care
from a variety of sources, ranging from nurse practitioners to
mobile medical apps.251
There is also a deeper issue. With respect to physicians,
we know that most physicians are willing to care for patients
with more than a single type of problem, but we also know that
very few physicians are willing to care for patients with every
type of problem. With respect to hospitals, we know that they
do far more than provide a place for patients to sleep, but we
are less confident about whether the successful treatment of a
particular problem depends primarily on characteristics of the
hospital or of the physicians who happen to be present there. If
a physician lacks a key credential, or a hospital lacks a critical
technology, it may disqualify that provider from certain ser249
See Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction,
FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 2011 WL 6917813 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2011) (No.
11–CV–50344); see also Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s
Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015).
250
For example, through its authority granted under section 3021 of the Affordable Care Act, the CMS Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation created
the Comprehensive Primary Care Initiative, which is designed, in part, to encourage primary care in an effort to reduce preventable hospitalizations. See
MELINDA ABRAMS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, REALIZING HEALTH REFORM’S POTENTIAL: HOW THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT WILL STRENGTHEN PRIMARY CARE AND BENEFIT
PATIENTS, PROVIDERS, AND PAYERS 10 (2011).
251
See Miranda Laurant et al., Substitution of Doctors by Nurses in Primary
Care (Review), COCHRANE LIBR., 2005, at 1, 2 (finding that properly trained nurses
can produce as high quality care as primary care physicians).
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vices—hence notions of “primary,” “secondary,” and “tertiary”
care.252 But what qualifies that provider to do a particular
task, and what makes that provider truly good at it, are harder
concepts to nail down.
2. Payer Submarkets
It is important to include all health care payers in most
competitive analyses. Plaintiffs in antitrust cases attempt to
draw markets as narrowly as possible, so that market concentration appears higher and the risk of anticompetitive effect
greater.253 One strategy, embraced by both the enforcement
agencies and private plaintiffs, has been to limit the alleged
product market to health care services purchased by private
payers, meaning commercial insurance companies and selfinsured employers rather than government health insurance
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.254 The logic behind
this position is that government programs pay administered
prices, not market prices, and therefore would not be harmed
economically by a merger.
However, the scale of government investment in health
care renders any analysis of competitive outcomes that focuses
only on private market transactions misleading.255 Public payers often set the tone for private payers, and competitive outcomes flow from the interaction between them. Medicare is an
essential funder of nearly all hospitals in the United States,
and its practices serve as a benchmark for both the amount
paid by private insurers and the payment methodology they
employ.256 Sometimes this occurs because government takes
252
See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1288 n.2 (W.D.
Mich. 1996) (defining these levels of care).
253
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 n.15
(1991) (“Because market power is often inferred from market share, market definition generally determines the result of the case.”); JetAway Aviation, LLC v. Bd. of
Cty. Comm’rs, 754 F.3d 824, 850 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting that the plaintiff bears
the burden of defining the relevant market in antitrust cases).
254
See, e.g., Sidibe v. Sutter Health, 4 F. Supp. 3d 1160, 1165–66 (N.D. Cal.
2013); First Amended Complaint at 16, Sidibe v. Sutter Health, 4 F. Supp. 3d
1160 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 3:12–cv–4854–LB) (noting that plaintiffs argue that the
relevant product market consisted of inpatient services not paid for by Medicare,
Medicaid, or government payers).
255
Moreover, excluding public payers has the unfortunate consequence of
making managed care contracting over faux products even more central to the
competitive analysis than if public payers were included. See supra text accompanying notes 198–203.
256
In addition to negotiating discounts based on “charges,” private insurers
often employ payment approaches based on government programs, such as explicit percentages of Medicare DRG payments, or per diem rates similar to those
used by Medicaid. For this reason, it is virtually certain that as Medicare changes
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the lead, as in the Medicare PPS (DRG) system, which was
tested at the state level and then adopted federally.257 At other
times, it occurs because government, for both political and
pragmatic reasons, models its policies on those already in place
in the private sector, as with the adoption of Medicare in
1965.258 Because the ACA relies heavily on both Medicare and
Medicaid, public payers will continue to be major drivers of
market performance.259
Although some courts have accepted a payer-specific product market definition,260 others have not. In Little Rock Cardiology Clinic v. Baptist Health,261 the plaintiff alleged a product
market limited to only those patients covered by private health
insurance. Finding this definition “legally flawed,” the district
court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.262 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed, holding that, “as a matter of law, in an antitrust claim brought by a seller, a product market cannot be
limited to a single method of payment when there are other
methods of payment that are acceptable to the seller.”263
3. Characterizing the Parties
Properly characterizing the parties in transactions that
might move the health care system from unassembled to assembled products is challenging. Antitrust enforcers are accustomed to using labels with clear economic meanings, such
as buyer, seller, vertical agreement, horizontal agreement, subits payment methods, collaborative structures (e.g., ACOs, medical homes), and
quality benchmarking practices, private insurers will pursue similar purchasing
strategies. See, e.g., BERENSON & BURTON, supra note 8 (noting that, while ACOs
are typically viewed as primarily a Medicare program, Medicare’s approach is
already affecting the way in which private health plans pay providers, with nearly
100 medical groups on track to become ACOs).
257
Janus & Brown, supra note 55, at 298 (discussing the adoption by the
federal government in 1983 of Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), which were
modeled off a successful program administered by the New Jersey Department of
Health in the late 1970s).
258
William M. Sage, Competition Policy and the Future of Health Care Markets 25 (Sept. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
259
See supra text accompanying note 198.
260
See, e.g., FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1080 (N.D. Ill.
2012) (noting that the FTC established a prima facie case that merger of two notfor-profit health care systems would be anticompetitive).
261
591 F.3d 591, 596–98 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding relevant product market
could not be limited to patients using private insurance and relevant geographic
market could not be limited to single city).
262
Id. at 595.
263
Id. at 598–99.
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stitute, or complement.264 Because of the complicated agency
relationships involved, and the consensus need for significant
industry restructuring to improve efficiency, these labels are
often ambiguous in health care.265 If hospitals and their affiliated physicians join forces to finance and direct comprehensive
care, for example, today’s providers may be tomorrow’s payers.
If care continues to move from dedicated facilities to community and home settings, today’s hospitals may be tomorrow’s
physicians. From the perspective of desired innovation, all intermediaries between a patient and the treatment he or she
receives are contestable.
The correct status of health insurers in the analysis of
competition is particularly difficult to ascertain. Antitrust laws
were enacted to protect consumers, and seller conduct in markets has usually been more closely scrutinized than buyer conduct.266 As a result, courts seldom inquire into the priorities
and practices of health plans when evaluating hospital mergers.267 However, health insurers can reasonably be regarded
not only as buyers from hospital systems but also as potentially competing with those systems to provide coordinated services (i.e., assembled products) for a bundled or global
payment. Arranging for comprehensive health care at affordable prices was the expected role for HMOs from the 1970s into
the 1990s and is a desired outcome of the current move toward
ACOs.268
264
See Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in
Antritrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241 (1987).
265
Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Monopsony as an Agency and Regulatory Problem in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 949, 950 (2004) (suggesting antitrust courts should pay closer attention to agency issues when evaluating the
conduct of the buyer in health care).
266
See El Aguila Food Prods., Inc. v. Gruma Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 612, 627
(S.D. Tex. 2003); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65,
122–29 (1982) (arguing that congressional debates over the Sherman Act condemned trusts and monopolies because they had enough power to unfairly extract wealth from consumers); Robert H. Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust
Laws Were Passed to Protect Consumers (Not Just Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 959, 961–62 (1999).
267
Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the
Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 615 (2002).
268
Before managed care devolved into insurer-provider bargaining toward the
end of the 1990s, hospital companies such as Humana developed or acquired
insurance businesses, which they operated alongside their provider businesses as
a vertical integration strategy. See David G. Knott, Vertical Integration: 80’s Fad
or Health Care’s Future?, in STRATEGY & BUSINESS (1997), (noting that health care
companies, including Humana, attempted to vertically integrate by acquiring hospitals); Hammer & Sage, supra note 267, at 567. After the public backlash
against that generation of managed care, integration receded as a corporate goal
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Similarly, the distinction between vertical and horizontal
agreements under established antitrust law needs to be refined
if it is to be correctly applied in health care. The FTC has
claimed that ACO-based systems such as Medicare’s Pioneer
and Shared Savings Programs envision mainly “vertical” integration between hospitals and physicians, not “horizontal” consolidation of hospitals.269 However, this mischaracterizes the
physician-hospital relationship and shortchanges the potential
efficiency gains from new financing and delivery models. Hospitals are not suppliers to physicians, nor are physicians sales
agents for hospitals—both typical vertical relationships.
Rather, physicians and hospitals are coproducers of acute and
complex medical care. Although collaboration between them
could be beneficial, they could as easily compete with each
other to deliver that care as medical organizations and products change.
4. Unilateral Effects and Status Quo Bias
Unlike earlier versions, the enforcement agencies’ 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines emphasize the “unilateral effects”
of mergers more than their “coordinated effects.”270 Collusion
is easier among fewer competitors (oligopoly), as is so-called
conscious parallelism, which is why concentrated industries
tend to be less competitive.271 A merger’s “coordinated effects”
are a measure of how much more likely it is that the remaining
competitors will act as a cartel.272 By contrast, a merger’s
“unilateral effects” are a measure of whether consumers are
likely to be disadvantaged by the elimination of competition
between the merging parties, regardless of other market participants.273 Since the 1990s, antitrust economists have developed increasingly sophisticated (and expensive) modeling tools
and the insurer and hospital businesses were separated again, for fear that unaffiliated hospitals (who had gained influence) would refuse to do business with an
insurer connected to a rival hospital system.
269
See Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 15–22, F.T.C. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 2012 WL 1144620 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5,
2012) (No. 11–cv–50344), 2011 WL 6917813; see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice &
Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding
Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings
Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011).
270
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 200, at 20.
271
There are many duopolies that are fiercely competitive, sometimes because
the rivalry between the two companies has acquired a personal dimension. See
id.; Erwin A. Blackstone et al., The Case of Duopoly: Industry Structure is Not a
Sufficient Basis for Imposing Regulation, 34 REG. 12, 17 (2012).
272
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 200, at 2.
273
Id. at 20.
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to demonstrate potential harm from consolidation, including
by estimating unilateral effects.274
One problem with unilateral effects analysis is that it biases the evidence toward past events even if the market environment is changing rapidly, as is the case today in the health
care system. Whether a market will be more collusive in the
future requires assessing the commercial conditions that are
likely to prevail in the future, as well as incorporating any
evidence that exists of past collusion. However, only historical
data on competition between the merging parties is sufficiently
comprehensive to feed the econometric models that estimate
unilateral effects. For example, these models use such data to
estimate the amount of business that each hospital would lose
to the other should it raise prices as an indicator of whether a
merger between them would eliminate an important source of
market discipline.275
The other problem with unilateral effects analysis is that it
often substitutes for defining markets with precision when
evaluating a merger of two large competitors. In fact, the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines de-emphasized product market
definition because unilateral effects tests seem to directly measure diminished competition following a merger.276 To the extent that agencies and courts are persuaded by critical loss
analysis and similar econometric models, they may no longer
require exact definitions of either product or geographic mar274
Examples include willingness to pay (WTP) and diversion analysis, which
are simulation-based methods that model patient flows and fee negotiations between health plans and the merging institutions. WTP is the maximum amount
an individual is willing to pay for services considering the other available hospitals. Amiram Gafni, Willingness to Pay: What’s in a Name?, 14
PHARMACOECONOMICS 465, 470 (1998). Diversion analysis evaluates the degree to
which the merging facilities are each other’s closest competitors. Subramaniam
Ramanarayanan, Diversion Analysis as Applied to Hospital Mergers: A Primer,
NERA June 24, 2014 (http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/
archive2/PUB_Diversion_Analysis_Hospital_Mergers_0614.pdf).
Another
method, critical loss analysis, which identifies for a given price increase the
amount of sales that can be lost before the price increase becomes unprofitable,
has been criticized. Daniel P. O’Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 161, 161 (2003).
275
O’Brien & Wickelgren, supra note 274, at 163–164.
276
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 200, at 21 (“Where
sufficient data are available, the Agencies may construct economic models designed to quantify the unilateral price effects resulting from the merger. . . . These
merger simulation methods need not rely on market definition.”). Thus far, courts
appear skeptical. See, e.g., Golden Gate Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., No.
C–09–3854 MMC, 2010 WL 1541257 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2010), aff’d, 433 F. App’x
598 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissing a complaint for a wide and unspecific product
market definition).
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kets.277 This may not be problematic in many industries, but
in health care it allows both enforcers and decision makers to
ignore the artificiality of what pass for products today as well as
what might be different in the future.278
Current investigative practices by the enforcement agencies similarly bias enforcement toward the status quo. There is
often a long preinvestigation phase, during which agencies
contact both the merging parties and others in the community,
aggressively elicit detailed testimony from current market participants, and gather large volumes of competitively sensitive
historical data for their econometric models.279 Among other
things, this approach may induce those interviewed to present
a more fixed view of the market than circumstances actually
warrant, and it may undervalue entry and innovation.
B. Antitrust Enforcement Actions and Product
Improvement
What forms of anticompetitive conduct most hinder product improvement in health care? There are two major categories of disputes in which antitrust enforcement is likely to have
beneficial effects. First are cases involving private exclusionary
conduct.280 The activity challenged in these cases has one objective: maintaining the status quo.281 If health care providers
lack a habit of selling assembled products, maybe new competitors—or at least the threat of new competitors—might instill it.
Antitrust enforcement can help ensure that these competitors
have a fair chance, both to compete as a general matter and to
serve particular customers and communities.
Second are situations involving the aggregation of providers or services into groups, the stated purpose of which is to
improve quality or efficiency. As Adam Smith recognized centuries ago, gatherings of competitors constitute an invitation to
277
J. Douglas Richards, Is Market Definition Necessary in Sherman Act Cases
When Anticompetitive Effects Can Be Shown with Direct Evidence?, 26 ANTITRUST
53, 54–55 (2012).
278
See supra text accompanying notes 154–56.
279
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 4 (2000) (noting procedures for initial
examinations of mergers and subsequent investigations) [hereinafter “ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS”].
280
Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST
L.J. 527, 532 (2013) (recognizing exclusion as a core concern of competition
policy).
281
See Hammer & Sage, supra note 267 at, 630 (noting that strict limitation of
standing to traditional customers and competitors in an industry will favor the
status quo).
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behave anticompetitively.282 In health care, however, physicians have been so atomized for so long—and so separated
from hospitals—that they need time and space to learn to work
together. In these situations, therefore, antitrust enforcers
need to be sensitive to context in order to judge whether a
particular aggregation is likely to succeed in bringing providers
together to construct assembled products, or whether it is
more likely to turn collusive or exclusionary.
1. Exclusionary Conduct Cases
Antitrust enforcement to prevent the exclusion of sellers
from markets is an important part of promoting product improvement. Although antitrust laws protect competition as a
whole, not individual competitors, it will be hard to move toward assembled health care products if potentially “disruptive”
innovators find themselves excluded from the boat for rocking
it.283 This is not to say that any party should have open access
to contracting partners or that established resources constitute “essential facilities.”284 To the contrary, producing an assembled product may well require greater rather than less
exclusivity. However, given the historically constrained patterns of buying and selling health care products that currently
prevail, making sure that new competitors can get a foot in the
door is important.
a. Professional Boards and Purported State Action
Obstacles to product improvement in health care may be
exacerbated by the intransigence of professional licensing bodies, which are authorized by state law but function as industry
self-regulators.285 Assembled health care products require
standardized production, organization and teamwork, warran282
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 117 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1910) (“People
of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to
raise prices.”).
283
Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Innovation (2015), http://www.clayton
christensen.com/key-concepts/ [http://perma.cc/68NG-BV3V] (describing a
process by which a product or service takes root initially in simple applications at
the bottom of a market and then relentlessly moves up market, eventually displacing established competitors).
284
Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust
Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 462 (2002) (noting that essential facilities doctrine is
applied cautiously in lower courts pursuant to limiting principles).
285
See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1096–97
(2014) (noting that licensing agencies often insulate incumbents from
competition).
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ties for poor quality, and continuous innovation in response to
consumer preferences. Health professional licensing bodies,
especially state boards of medicine, represent the opposite values: professional discretion, generous payment, individual
physician control, accountability only for egregious harm, and
practice set by habit and tradition under the guise of ethics.
Scholarly criticism of occupational licensing, previously
associated mainly with libertarian thought, is becoming significantly broader.286 Because most members of licensing bodies
are selected from the profession they oversee, they tend to
guard their professional turf and view most issues through the
lens of their own training and practice. They understand their
job as protecting the public, but they seldom offer the public a
strong or direct voice. As a result, it is the rare professional
board that acts contrary to the economic interests of its licensees. Nor do they tend to work cooperatively with licensing
boards for other professions, even those that are engaged in
service to the same clientele.
A recent upturn in federal antitrust challenges to anticompetitive conduct by professional licensing boards is a positive
sign for product enhancement in health care. A watershed
case is North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC,287
which was decided by the United States Supreme Court in
early 2015. North Carolina Board involved cease-and-desist
letters sent by a state dental board to nondentist sellers of
teeth whitening services, as well as to owners of the shopping
malls where many such businesses are located.288 The letters
advised them, without any formal legal determination under
the Board’s statutory authority, that their activities constituted
the unlicensed practice of dentistry and could be prosecuted as
286
Professional licensing boards, especially the powerful medical boards controlled by physicians, have attracted criticism from conservative economists for
decades. Milton Friedman wrote in 1962, “I am . . . persuaded that [restrictive]
licensure has reduced both the quantity and quality of medical practice; . . . that it
has forced the public to pay more for less satisfactory medical service, and that it
has retarded technological development both in medicine itself and in the organization of medical practice.” MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 149–59
(1962). See also Edlin & Haw, supra note 285, at 1094 (contending that the state
action doctrine should not prevent antitrust suits against state licensing boards
that are comprised of private competitors); Alexander Volokh, The New PrivateRegulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 933 (2014) (suggesting useful tools to challenge selfinterested private regulation).
287
135 S. Ct. 1101, 1101 (2015), aff’g N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC,
717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013).
288
See id. at 1109.
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a crime.289 FTC’s Bureau of Competition challenged this collective conduct as an unfair trade practice by representatives of
the private dental profession, and its internal adjudicatory ruling was upheld on appeal by the Fourth Circuit.290 Affirming
that decision, the Supreme Court held categorically that professional boards and other state agencies controlled by current
market participants could not claim state action immunity unless their conduct is actively supervised by the state itself.291
This holding may have lasting benefits for competitive entry in
professional services, much of which should involve assembled
products that appeal to consumers.
b. Excluding Rival Professions
If health care products are to improve, it is important that
professionals with diverse training, skills, priorities, and ways
of doing things be allowed access to health care markets. However, physicians often have discouraged both competition and
innovation by excluding other classes of health professionals or
nonprofessional actors from providing health care services.292
Often this is done through state legislation or the actions of
licensing boards described above. But it can also be attempted
in private, particularly in connection with limiting the classes
of provider who receive hospital privileges or are permitted to
join managed care networks.293 In the latter case, insurers
may be complicit in imposing restrictions because admitting
new types of professionals would likely expand the number and
variety of disaggregated process steps that they are obligated to
cover and finance.
Most litigated cases have been brought by private parties
and have involved longstanding professional rivalries, such as
between orthopedic physicians and chiropractors, or between
physician ophthalmologists and optometrists. In American
Chiropractic Association v. Trigon Healthcare Inc., a chiropractic
group sued Virginia’s largest health insurance company, claim289

Id.
See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 375.
291
The Supreme Court had previously addressed the state action doctrine in
2013, holding unanimously that a Georgia public hospital’s acquisition of its
principal rival was not authorized by state law in a manner that shielded it from
antitrust scrutiny. See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003,
1007 (2013).
292
See Philip C. Kissam, Government Policy Toward Medical Accreditation and
Certification: The Antitrust Laws and Other Procompetitive Strategies, 1983 WIS. L.
REV. 1, 7–12 (1983).
293
See Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health, 591 F.3d 591, 594
(8th Cir. 2009).
290
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ing it conspired with its advisory committee of physicians and
“created false referral guidelines meant to limit the usage of
chiropractors for the treatment of lower back pain.”294 In Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., a group of optometrists
sued an integrated delivery system that includes both hospitals
and managed care plans, alleging that it conspired with ophthalmologists “to exclude optometrists as a class” from providing nonsurgical eye care services to enrollees.295 These private
complaints have seldom succeeded in court,296 but the antitrust agencies should be alert to situations involving dominant
insurers and large groups of favored practitioners.
c. Excluding Specialty Hospitals and Their PhysicianOwners
“Specialty hospitals” have been plaintiffs in several recent
antitrust disputes.297 These cases typically involve allegations
that traditional hospitals conspired together and with health
insurers to keep a physician-owned hospital out of the market.298 As one court noted, these cases
ultimately involve[ ] the proper place of physician-owned
healthcare ventures in the broad landscape of United States
healthcare. Both sides insist they solely possess the moral
high ground . . . [but n]either side can make a colorable
argument that the parties’ profits is not a central factor in
their dispute.299
294
367 F.3d 212, 221 (4th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the claim on the ground that a
corporation cannot conspire with itself, and deeming the committee its corporate
agent).
295
461 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2006) (dismissing the claims for lack of
standing or antitrust injury).
296
See id. at 1266.
297
See, e.g., Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Premier Health Partners, 294
F.R.D. 87, 87-88 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (“[P]hysician-owned hospital . . . alleg[ed] that
defendants coerced commercial health insurers to refuse plaintiff full access to
their networks and that defendants coerced insurers to provide reimbursement
rates below market and below the rates defendants demanded for the same services.”); Rome Ambulatory Surgical Ctr., LLC v. Rome Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 349 F.
Supp. 2d 389, 389 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[A]mbulatory surgical facility that went out of
business sued non-profit community hospital, alleging antitrust violations under
Sherman Act.”).
298
See supra note 294–95.
299
Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp., LLC v. Midwest Div., Inc., 527 F. Supp.
2d 1257, 1264 (D. Kan. 2007) (denying summary judgment in a suit by a physician-owned hospital offering orthopedic, neurological, plastic, and general surgery, as well as pain management, against two managed care organizations and
four hospitals). But see Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health, 591
F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (dismissing claims that the largest hospital company and the largest insurer in Arkansas conspired “to restrain trade in, and
monopolize the market for, cardiology services for privately insured patients” by
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While the majority of these cases are brought privately, and
none have been initiated by the DOJ or FTC, at least one case
involved public enforcement.300 In Texas v. Memorial Hermann
Healthcare System, the state attorney general filed suit against
a major hospital system, alleging it discouraged health insurers from doing business with Houston Town and Country Hospital by threatening to terminate contracts with, or impose
substantial rate increases on, health plans that contracted
with the physician-owned facility.301
Specialty hospitals represent a mixed blessing for improving the products sold in health care markets. On one hand,
evidence exists that these physician-owned businesses may
cherry-pick lucrative procedures on well-insured patients,
leaving community hospitals fewer resources with which to finance comprehensive services and care for the uninsured.302
For these reasons, the federal government placed a three-year
moratorium on specialty hospitals in the early 2000s,303 which
was essentially made permanent by changes to federal fraud
and abuse law in the ACA.304
On the other hand, provider organizations with strong physician leadership and a commitment to excellence in a limited
number of services are more likely to offer them on an assembled basis for a competitive price.305 It is therefore likely that
federal law will change again in the future to allow physicianowned specialty hospitals, ambulatory surgery centers, and
other integrated clinical organizations receiving bundled payments to compete against traditional community hospitals.
revoking a cardiology group’s admitting privileges and in-network contract after it
launched a new heart hospital).
300
See Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Texas v. Mem’l Hermann Healthcare Sys.,
(No. 2009–04609) (2009).
301
Id.
302
See Lawrence P. Casalino et al., Focused Factories? Physician-Owned Specialty Facilities, 22 HEALTH AFF. 56, 67 (2003) (describing the recent increase in
physician-owned specialty hospitals, reasons for this increase, possible impacts,
and potential policy options).
303
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108–173, § 117, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
304
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 6001,
124 Stat. 119 (2010).
305
See SURGERY CTR. OF OKLA., Surgery Pricing (2015), http://www.surgery
centerok.com/pricing/ [http://perma.cc/A45F-8SX7]; see generally REGINA E.
HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA’S LARGEST SERVICE INDUSTRY 157–99 (1997) (hypothesizing that
integrated delivery systems will give way to “focused factories” that offer all the
care needed to treat a particular disease).
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d. Contractual Entrenchment
Close scrutiny of provider-insurer arrangements that deter
competitive entry on one or both sides of the payment relationship is an important part of competition policy. Health care
products cannot be efficiently assembled and sold without contractual flexibility.306 Longstanding control by the medical profession, which traditionally assumed privileges and obligations
based on status, led the health care system to underuse contracts for most of its history.307
However, contracts involving dominant players in current
health care markets can deter entry by new competitors and
consequent innovation by making the business opportunities
they cover less contestable. Economist Fiona Scott Morton describes these as “contracts that reference rivals.”308 Antitrust
enforcers should scrutinize these contracts for unreasonable
restraints of trade that exclude potential competitors on either
side of the transaction.
It is tempting to think of a health insurer as a motivated
purchaser of medical care, but insurers are imperfect agents
for policyholders and for the private employers who sponsor
most health coverage.309 Unlike physicians, who tend to work
through licensing boards or professional groups to exclude unwelcome competitors, health insurers and hospitals are corporate organizations that more often erect barriers to competition
as part of their private business agreements.310
In some cases, an insurer or provider alleges that another
provider and insurer have entered into an agreement that excludes it but sues only its direct competitor. The counterparty
to the agreement is seen as grudgingly participating to ensure
that it is not harmed. In other cases, insurers and providers
seem to be willfully working together for their mutual benefit,
306

See Dranove & Ludwick supra note 183.
Compare CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 250 (1995) (outlining how innovative health care
contracts can be structured to provide varied levels of coverage and pricing in
order to allow real choice in benefits and costs, rather than letting the federal
government dictate the degree of insurance one must purchase), with HENRY
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861) (positing a general transition of legal obligations from
status in ancient societies to contract in modern ones).
308
Fiona M. Scott Morton, Contracts that Reference Rivals, 27 ANTITRUST 72, 72
(2013) (defining such contracts as “a contract between a buyer and a seller that
refers to, and whose terms may depend on, information outside this ‘standard’
buyer-seller contractual relationship . . . [based on] information . . . from other
transactions to which those same firms are . . . party.” (emphasis added)).
309
See Hammer & Sage, supra note 267.
310
See supra notes 297–99.
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and both parties are sued by the excluded rival.311 Most antitrust cases that arise from these situations are brought by
private plaintiffs, but public enforcement also plays an important role.312
DOMINANT INSURERS AND MFNS. Large incumbent firms can
use “most-favored-customer” clauses (also called “most-favored-nation” clauses or MFNs) to discourage vendors from
price discounting to smaller competitors or potential entrants,
which may also deter quality-based competition and product
innovation. This is a common tactic among large medical and
dental insurers in their provider agreements with hospitals and
health professionals.313 Traditionally, courts regarded MFNs
as “standard devices by which buyers try to bargain for low
prices” and therefore procompetitive.314 However, some courts
have recognized the potential for MFNs to facilitate cartelization among sellers and increase prices, or—with the most direct consequences for innovation—to raise costs for potential
market entrants.315 The weight of recent opinion is critical of
MFNs, which is good news for competition policymakers attempting to dislodge entrenched parties and encourage new
competitors who are more likely to offer better products.
Three lawsuits have been brought against Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Michigan for its use of MFN clauses in contracts with
hospitals, with the first filed by the DOJ in 2010.316 At the
time, the defendant’s health plans covered 60% of Michigan’s
311
See, e.g., West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 100
(3d Cir. 2010).
312
As a matter of agency jurisdiction, these cases are typically brought by the
DOJ, not the FTC. See, e.g., United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 809 F.
Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (denying motion to dismiss Sherman Act case
against dominant health insurer for including “most-favored-customer” clauses
in contracts with hospitals); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Texas Hospital Prohibiting Anticompetitive Contracts with Health Insurers (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
press_releases/2011/267648.htm [https://perma.cc/78S7-LCC5] (litigation
against dominant hospital for entering into contracts with health insurer that
prohibit dealing with other hospitals).
313
See, e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 669.
314
Blue Cross Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1415
(7th Cir. 1995) (stating that MFN clauses do not, as a matter of law, violate the
Sherman Act).
315
See United States v. Delta Dental of Rhode Island, 943 F. Supp. 172, 192
(D.R.I. 1996) (“The net effect is an alleged detrimental impact on the dental market
without any discernible competitive benefits.”).
316
See Blue Cross Blue Shield, 809 F. Supp. 2d. Additional suits based on the
same facts were filed by a competing insurer, Aetna Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield,
No. 11–CV–15346, 2013 WL 1831320 (E.D. Mich. June 14, 2012), and by a class
of individuals and business that purchased health insurance, Shane Grp., Inc. v.
Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 10-14360, 2012 WL 5990219 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 30,
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commercially insured population, and it had agreements containing MFNs with over 40% of Michigan’s general acute care
hospitals.317 The hospitals were seen as having little choice
and were not sued; the court’s opinions suggest that a hospital
that declined to sign would have been paid up to 16% less by
Blue Cross.318 The State of Michigan subsequently enacted
laws banning the use of MFNs by the health insurance
industry.319
DOMINANT HOSPITALS. Large hospitals may also disadvantage potential rivals by contract. In Palmyra Park Hospital, Inc.
v. Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, a smaller for-profit hospital alleged that a nonprofit facility forced health insurers to
deal with it only.320 Palmyra claimed that “Phoebe Putney leverage[s] its monopoly power over the medical services requiring
[certificates of need] to force Blue Cross (and other insurers) to
exclude Palmyra from their provider networks” for all services,
in violation of the Clayton Act’s prohibition on tying arrangements.321 Reversing the lower court, the Eleventh Circuit held
Palmyra had antitrust standing to sue.322 In United States v.
United Regional Health Care System of Wichita Falls, Texas,323
the DOJ and the Texas attorney general brought suit to enjoin
United Regional from inserting terms into contracts with insurers that prevented those insurers from contracting with its
competitors.324 United Regional had a market share of approximately 90% for inpatient hospital services and 65% for outpatient hospital services, and insurers unwilling to contract
exclusively with it paid substantially more for services.325
MUTUAL ADVANTAGE. Breaking up cozy relationships that
keep out other competitors is a valuable aspect of antitrust
enforcement. Large providers and large insurers have a mutual interest in maintaining the status quo. In particular, the
notion of “must-have” hospitals in insurance networks has invited dealmaking that is almost certainly adverse to consumers. The infamous “handshake in the snow,” for example,
resolved a standoff between Partners HealthCare in Boston and
2012). In each case the District Court denied Blue Cross’s motion to dismiss,
finding that the plaintiffs met the requirements for antitrust standing.
317
Blue Cross Blue Shield, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 668–69.
318
Id. at 669.
319
2013 Mich. Pub. Acts 4, 5.
320
604 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2010).
321
Id. at 1296.
322
Id. at 1303.
323
No. 7:11CV00030, 2011 WL 846762 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2011).
324
Id. at *17.
325
Id. at *12–14.
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Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts but did not secure
any competitive gains for the market.326
Another example is Western Pennsylvania, which has experienced over a decade of contractual maneuvering intended
to keep new competitors out of the market. Private health care
in Pittsburgh and environs has long been dominated by the
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC), which owns a
majority of the hospital beds and employs a very large number
of physicians, and by Highmark, a nonprofit health insurer
that combines the former Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans of
western Pennsylvania.327 The second-largest hospital organization in the area is West Penn Allegheny Health System
(WAHS), a combination of several smaller hospitals.328 In the
early 2000s, Highmark attempted to undermine UPMC’s dominant position by providing a large loan to WAHS and setting up
a low-cost insurance option that paid hospitals less than
UPMC, but not WAHS, was willing to accept.329 UPMC responded by creating its own health plan to compete against
Highmark.330
In 2005, however, Highmark and UPMC began to act more
like allies. UPMC refused to discount fees for hospital services
to other health plans that were considering entering the Pennsylvania market, and Highmark increased its reimbursement
rates to UPMC.331 UPMC scaled back its own health plan, and
Highmark shut down its low-cost insurance option that had
not included UPMC.332 Highmark declined to refinance its loan
to WAHS, and UPMC began a systematic effort to hire away
several of WAHS’s best physicians.333 WAHS eventually filed
an antitrust suit against UPMC and Highmark that paints a
clear picture of Highmark and UPMC “[conspiring] to protect
one another from competition.”334 Subsequent market developments have been ratified by state regulators but have not
increased competition.335
326
Scott Allen & Marcella Bombardieri, A Handshake that Made Healthcare
History, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Dec. 28, 2008, at A1, A14.
327
West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 91–92 (3d
Cir. 2010).
328
Id. at 92.
329
Id.
330
Id.
331
Id. at 93.
332
Id.
333
Id. at 94.
334
Id. at 91 (denying motion to dismiss).
335
In 2011, while still in litigation, Highmark changed its strategy and partners yet again, and it offered to become affiliated with WAHS. WAHS accepted the
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2. Joint Production or Pricing Cases
The second major category of antitrust cases important to
inducing the development of assembled products involves the
process of production and associated pricing. Full corporatization of health care delivery with employed, salaried physicians
may be years away, if it comes at all. For the foreseeable future, then, there cannot be a sizable complement of assembled
products unless independent economic actors come together to
produce them and to negotiate their sale.
Not surprisingly, collective activity of this sort may raise
concerns regarding its anticompetitive potential. The FTC website provides a list of all the agency’s health care antitrust
actions since 1996.336 Of 190 cases the agency initiated, 33
(17%) were collective bargaining or horizontal price-fixing cases
filed in 2000 or later, typically involving joint pricing by physicians of their own services.337 Unlike exclusion cases, however, which typically require more aggressive enforcement,
joint production or joint pricing cases may require less aggressive, or at least more selective, enforcement if assembled products are to develop.
a. “Clinical Integration” and New Products
In the early years of managed care, it often proved difficult
to persuade physicians in private practice to bear financial risk
when joining a new contracting intermediary such as an independent practice association.338 Because joint price negotiation by physicians who did not share substantial financial risk

offer. Press Release—Highmark, West Penn Allegheny Health System (WPAHS)
and WPAHS Bondholder Representatives Reach an Agreement that Positions the
Health System for Financial Stability, HIGHMARK (Jan. 16, 2013), https://
www.highmark.com/hmk2/newsroom/2013/pr011613.shtml [http://perma.cc/
CCU2-BAMJ]. After undergoing regulatory review, the transaction received approval from the Pennsylvania Department of Insurance, subject to certain conditions. Pennsylvania Insurance Dep’t, Opinion Letter on West Penn Allegheny
Health System entering into a $700,000,000 term loan and the guaranty by
Highmark Inc. of that term loan (May 20, 2014).
336
See Cases Tagged with Health Care, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://
www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/terms/282 [http://perma.cc/
9UVF-GYHQ].
337
Id.
338
See Jonathan P. Weiner & Gregory de Lissovoy, Razing a Tower of Babel: A
Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y
& L. 75, 83 (1993) (offering a taxonomy of managed care organizations).
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was considered a per se violation of the Sherman Act,339 physician networks faced a significant barrier to formation.
Since the mid-1990s, the antitrust agencies have permitted independent physicians who participate in provider networks and are “clinically integrated” to jointly negotiate fees
with insurers without it automatically constituting unlawful
price fixing.340 Clinical integration was rationalized by the enforcement agencies as akin to offering a new product, which
might justify joint pricing even without shared financial risk.341
However, nothing approximating the delivery of assembled
products—which would be indisputably “new”—has been demanded of physicians.342 Instead, the agencies have accepted
a variety of joint investments in quality or efficiency of care as
clinical integration, such as shared health information systems, common treatment protocols, and uniform processes for
reviewing the quality and cost-effectiveness of care.343
Going forward, the enforcement agencies should narrow
the clinical integration exception, obligating providers who are
not sharing financial risk to demonstrate that they have reengineered care to create assembled products and have measured outcomes associated with those products. Much as
prices should relate to complete services, not isolated inputs,
quality benchmarks should represent actual utility, not technical details that at best represent minor contributors to the
ultimate success of care.344

339
See Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (holding
maximum–fee agreements for physician services to be per se unlawful under the
Sherman Act).
340
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 90–91 (1996), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/0000.htm [http://perma.cc/DA4Z-H6NX]; Letter from Fed.
Trade Comm’n to John J. Miles, Esquire, Counsel for MedSouth Inc. 1–2 (Jun. 18,
2007), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advisory-opinions/
medsouth-inc./070618medsouth.pdf [http://perma.cc/LE4Q-AZX5] [hereinafter
“STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1996”].
341
See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979)
(holding the issuance of blanket licenses does not constitute price fixing per se
unlawful under the antitrust laws because, in part, blanket licenses are a new
product).
342
See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 39
n.275.
343
See STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1996, supra note 340, at
111.
344
See generally William M. Sage et al., Why Competition Law Matters to
Health Care Quality, 22 HEALTH AFF. 31, 34–36 (2003) (surveying the ways competition law and policy have affected quality-based competition in health care).
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b. Product Bundling
Because large providers and large insurers have a mutual
interest in maintaining the status quo, the challenge for competition policymakers is to distinguish insurer-provider transactions that make products more useful for patients from
transactions that shelter existing businesses from competitive
threats. For example, insurers often require hospitals with
which they contract to negotiate fees for all of their services
simultaneously, instead of as single services or in discrete
groups.345 One interpretation of this practice is that insurers
are assembling products to be sold to policyholders, and that
less than comprehensive services and associated coverage
would have lower value for consumers.
The problem is that a large hospital able to do business on
these terms becomes a “must-have” for health insurance networks, conferring economic benefits on large hospitals that are
not available to smaller hospitals.346 And insurers that prove
their ability to negotiate comprehensively over fees acquire similarly special cachet with their employer clients. This can happen notwithstanding the fact that unassembled services are
still unassembled services, even if they all appear on a single
list of negotiated prices. Although packaged treatments for episodes of care will usually improve competition, “bundles” of
per-service fees not tied to the treatment of any particular illness may render markets less contestable by preventing competitors from offering more limited, but lower-priced or higherquality alternatives.347
c. ACOs and Provider Bottlenecks
As with bundling of covered services into all-or-nothing
aggregates, having physicians contract exclusively with a single managed care network or other integrated organization may
either improve the products offered to consumers or erect a
barrier to competition. The DOJ and FTC favor nonexclusive
contracts, particularly for medical specialists, under which
physicians who agree to provide services to one insurer or in345
See Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly
Problem in Health Care, 89 OR. L. REV. 847, 876 (2011) (noting “hospitals’ practice
of negotiating a comprehensive pricing formula for large bundles of their services”
with purchasers like insurance companies).
346
See id. at 853 (suggesting that large hospitals with greater market power
enjoy a competitive advantage).
347
See id. at 876 (suggesting that antitrust enforcers should require hospitals
to unbundle services to allow purchasers to negotiate lower fees).
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termediary organization still may serve other insurers or organizations as well.348
The theory behind physician nonexclusivity is that exclusive contracting deters entry by new insurers hoping to form
their own networks because existing providers have been
“locked up.”349 Exclusivity also aggregates physicians into
groups that might themselves gain market power over consumers.350 From the perspective of assembled products, however,
context matters. If physicians are simply fungible inputs to
insurance networks, nonexclusivity may be preferable in order
to prevent bottlenecks in supply from forming. If physician
commitment drives performance, however, exclusive relationships may be more conducive to meeting industrial standards
for quality and reliability, and therefore may enable provider
organizations to develop assembled products that are more
rather than less competitive.
This question has been important to the antitrust guidance
the DOJ and FTC offer to Accountable Care Organizations
(ACOs). Medicare’s “shared-savings” ACO model rewards physician-hospital partnerships that meet quality benchmarks at
lower cost than traditional, fee-for-service Medicare.351 ACOs
enable physicians and hospitals to work together more efficiently because of greater transparency, stronger accountability metrics, and better-designed incentives.352 Accordingly,
ACO theorists endorse competition among ACOs in communities that can support more than one ACO, but do not assume
that each existing hospital in a community will draw primary
care physicians into orbit around it and survive only on the
specialized business they refer.353
348

See Greaney, supra note 29, at 71.
See id. at 74.
350
Even physicians who have the right to contract with several organizations
may not do so, particularly if they are earning high fees because of the market
power inherent in their existing organization. See id. at 77–78 (discussing the
failure of enforcement agencies and the courts to influence hospital organizational
structure).
351
See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable
Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76
Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011).
352
See id. at 67,8104, 67,810, 67,804.
353
That model had failed in the early 1990s. Managed care organizations had
instituted crude “gatekeeping” requirements to reduce direct access to physician
specialists. Hospitals responded by building satellite clinics and acquiring primary care practices to keep the patients coming anyway. See GEORGE B. MOSELEY,
III, MANAGED CARE STRATEGIES: A PHYSICIAN PRACTICE DESK REFERENCE 130 (1st ed.
1999) (recommending the use of primary care physicians as “gatekeepers” to
specialist referrals and opening satellite clinics in response to the demands of
managed care organizations).
349

R
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The enforcement agencies initially proposed requiring
Medicare ACOs exceeding certain physician participation
thresholds to obtain antitrust preclearance but retreated from
that position in the final rule.354 Still, ACOs need to be more
than “good guys” bearing insurance risk, like the stillborn “provider-sponsored organizations” that politicians supported as
physician-led alternatives to commercial HMOs in the
1990s.355 Antitrust enforcers evaluating ACOs therefore
should urge them to design and deliver assembled products,
and should work with regulators to institute systems of payment based on the value to patients of the specific products
ACOs offer as well as on the aggregate savings they generate for
Medicare.
d. Price Information
Because assembled products will not be developed unless
patients demand them, better consumer information is essential if they are to become marketable. When private sellers
share information about pricing in real time, however, antitrust
enforcers worry that it will facilitate price fixing.356 The agencies’ 1996 joint Policy Statement on Antitrust Enforcement in
the Healthcare Industry both acknowledges the competitive
benefits of information and attaches conditions to private sharing.357 Although the DOJ has issued favorable business review
letters to payers sharing hospital costs among themselves and
with providers,358 the agencies also have signaled their concern

354
See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable
Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76
Fed. Reg. at 67,026–32.
355
See Edward Hirshfeld, Assuring the Solvency of Provider-Sponsored Organizations, HEALTH AFF., 1996, at 28, 29–30 (discussing solvency risks).
356
See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 41.
357
See STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1996, supra note 340, at
55–57. The agencies agreed not to take action if the information was (1) managed
by a third party, (2) based on data more than three months old, (3) aggregated
from at least five providers, (4) not including more than 25% of any single provider’s business, and (5) not identifiable to any individual provider.
358
See Letter from Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Mit Spears, Esquire, Counsel for Ropes & Gray LLP (Apr. 26, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/258013.htm [http://perma.cc/
V9XJ-7TCV] (Department of Justice Business Review Letter on “value indices”);
see also Letter from William J. Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Colin R. Kass, Esquire, Counsel for Proskauer Rose LLP (Jan. 16, 2013), http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/291451.htm [http://perma.cc/RM9WDDZ4] (Department of Justice Business Review Letter on gainsharing).
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about potential collusion arising from information sharing in
other industries.359
Economic theory holds that a market with very similar
pricing across competitors can be collusive, but it can also be
perfectly competitive. Health care remains inefficient in part
because prices paid in past transactions are often kept secret.360 On balance, it seems likely that opaque or incoherent
pricing has caused more harm to competition in health care
than could plausibly result from greater transparency. Absent
unusual circumstances, therefore, antitrust enforcers should
be open to information sharing and should encourage prices
for comparable, useful products and services to become as
readily available to consumers in health care as in other
industries.
Reduced price discrimination is another potential benefit
of price transparency, especially for assembled products. Legal
prohibitions on price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act do not apply to service markets,361 and antitrust law
has generally favored unconstrained bargaining between buyers and sellers.362 In health care, however, the relationship
between prices and underlying costs has been obscured by
third-party payment, fragmented care delivery, and traditions
of shifting expense from price-sensitive to price-insensitive
buyers.363 Each health care provider charges a range of prices
to different customers, typically offering substantial discounts
to health insurers and charging self-pay patients full freight.364
For disaggregated products, this variation not only reflects
each provider’s uneven bargaining power vis-à-vis particular
payers but also suggests that many providers have a less-than359
See In re Sigma Corp., FTC File No. 101 0080 (2012), http://www.ftc.gov/
os/caselist/1010080/index.shtm [http://perma.cc/5ZZC-BNQN] (consent decree involving the three major U.S. suppliers of ductile iron fittings).
360
See Alan M. Garber & Jonathan Skinner, Is American Health Care Uniquely
Inefficient?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 27, 28 (2008) (“The fundamental cause is a combination of high prices for inputs, poorly restrained incentives for overutilization,
and a tendency to adopt expensive medical innovations rapidly, even when evidence of effectiveness is weak or absent.”); Morgan A. Muir et al., Clarifying Costs:
Can Increased Price Transparency Reduce Health Care Spending?, 4 WM. & MARY
POL’Y REV. 319, 323 (2013) (noting that a lack of transparency regarding health
care may contribute to higher prices).
361
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936).
362
See supra notes 266–67.
363
See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 19, 35;
Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care Industry, supra note 203, at 9.
364
Under the ACA, federally tax-exempt hospitals may not collect amounts
from uninsured individuals exceeding what the hospitals would have collected
from a typical private insurer.
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firm grasp of the cost of producing their services.365 Nondiscriminatory pricing for basic medical services therefore may
have competitive benefits, encouraging providers to investigate
and optimize their cost structures, allowing consumers to comparison shop, and blunting the bargaining advantages currently enjoyed by large, but often unimaginative and selfinterested payers.
C. Coordinated Strategies for Improving Health Care
Products
Developing a “new normal” of improved competition to deliver assembled products will require deliberate alignment between antitrust enforcement and the regulatory environment
as health reform proceeds. Federal antitrust enforcement is
often a prosecutorial enterprise, but both agencies engage in
other activities as well. From to time, for example, the DOJ and
FTC have jointly issued industry-specific policy statements regarding their enforcement practices and priorities in health
care.366 The impetus for the initial set of policy statements,
released in 1993, was stakeholder uncertainty regarding the
lawfulness of new business configurations and collaborations
that might help the industry adapt to the Clinton administration’s health reform proposal.367 A similar need motivated the
guidance issued with respect to ACOs after the ACA was enacted, although nothing as comprehensive as the policy statements of the 1990s has yet been released.
The 1993 policy statements were expanded and clarified in
1994 and 1996, painting a reasonably complete picture of how
the agencies perceived collective activity in connection with the
managed care practices of that era.368 Although the “safety
zones” identified in the 1996 statements were still relatively
narrow, they were based on greater experience with health care
and therefore did significantly more work than the 1993 statements, which essentially restated then-current law in simple
365
See Robert S. Kaplan et al., Using Time-Driven Activity-Based Costing to
Identify Value-Improvement Opportunities in Healthcare, 59 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT.
399 (2014) (proposing methods for accurate cost measurement).
366
See, e.g., ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS,
supra note 279; STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1996, supra note
340.
367
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
POLICY STATEMENTS IN THE HEALTH CARE AREA 1–2 (1993).
368
See STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1996, supra note 340;
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND
ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST (1994).
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language.369 Around the same time, the FTC began issuing
advisory opinions on proposed transactions in response to inquiries from private parties, and the DOJ continued its similar
practice of issuing business review letters.370
In the years between the Clinton proposal and the ACA, the
agencies remained active in policy formation, generally aligning
their pronouncements with regulatory developments. Led by
the FTC, both agencies even systematically surveyed the competitive landscape of health care in the early 2000s, holding
months of hearings and publishing a book-length report.371
On the other hand, the economics-driven documents that
the agencies use to communicate some of their most important
enforcement policies are not industry specific, and they seldom
take account of the regulatory environment. The joint venture
guidelines released in 2000, for example, clearly present the
prevailing framework for legal analysis but mention neither
direct government regulation nor professional self-regulation.372 Similarly, the 2010 FTC/DOJ Horizontal Merger
Guidelines instruct antitrust oversight agencies to scrutinize
the realities of competition in actual markets,373 but they use
far less regulated industries than health care to illustrate their
analytic points.374 The agencies’ caution in this regard is understandable because guidelines that set special rules for some
industries might send inaccurate messages to others. But the
result is to deny industry participants detailed guidance about
how the agencies interpret the competitive landscape in health
care given its regulatory peculiarities.
The FTC engages the regulatory environment most directly
through its “competition advocacy” agenda. Using hearings,
reports, and cautionary communications to state governments
and public agencies, the FTC has identified and attempted to
reduce several regulatory obstacles to health care competition.375 The successful legal challenge to the North Carolina
369

STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1996, supra note 340, at 2.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, ADVISORY OPINIONS (1993–2015), https://
www.ftc.gov/policy/advisory-opinions [https://perma.cc/8HC6-VU9A]; U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUSINESS REVIEW LETTERS AND REQUEST LETTERS (1992–2015),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/business-review-letters-and-request-letters [http://
perma.cc/6PAH-4TV7].
371
FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 124.
372
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 279, § 3.1.
373
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 200, §§ 1–2.
374
See, e.g., id. § 4 (providing examples relating to, among other markets,
motorcycles and glass containers).
375
See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, Health Care Competition, https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/mergers-competition/health-care-
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Board of Dental Examiners discussed above, for example, followed a sustained effort to convey to state governments the
FTC’s concern about the misuse of state action immunity.376
Explicit collaboration between antitrust enforcers and regulators to improve health care products would be a welcomed
development in U.S. health and competition policy as the ACA
is implemented. The coordinated statements issued in 2011 by
the antitrust agencies, fraud regulators, and the Internal Revenue Service set a useful precedent for policy collaboration but
lacked a clear vision of what competition involving ACOs might
achieve.377
In designing and executing a collaborative agenda, competition policymakers should urge regulators to reimagine health
care as a dynamic terrain of contestable markets open to new
skills, organizations, and technologies, rather than regarding it
as a mature economic sector limited to an established set of
professional and institutional actors. Among other things,
policymakers should work to dispel myths about price-quality
tradeoffs in health care that have long boosted physicians’ incomes and limited consumer choice. Rather than allowing entrenched interests to assert without evidence the necessity of
allowing individual physicians broad discretion over the deployment of complex and costly resources, policymakers
should assess the competitive consequences of relying to a
greater extent on industrial production models with standardization, quality control, and supply chain management.
Both antitrust enforcers and relevant regulators also
should explicitly connect the strategies they pursue to product
improvement. Most important are bundled forms of provider
payment that neither reimburse disaggregated services nor
simply shift insurance risk from one level of organization to
another. Other desirable approaches include transparency
regulation that enables consumers to more easily compare
price and quality; liberalized professional licensing laws that
increase access to affordable basic care; standards for intercompetition [http://perma.cc/3V2E-4BX2]. The FTC has also hosted public
events on a range of new developments in the health care industry under both its
competition and its consumer protection authorities.
376
See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013),
aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (state board engaged in anticompetitive conduct by
sending cease-and-desist letters to nondentists engaged in tooth whitening).
377
See Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care Industry, supra note 203;
Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg.
67,026–32 (Oct. 28, 2011).
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operability among health information systems and digital medical devices; and modifications to government oversight that
increase the diversity of cost-effective diagnostic and therapeutic aids, such as mobile health technologies for remote care and
self-management.
1. Stop Paying for Random Inputs
Payment reform is both the most promising and the most
often attempted strategy to improve health care products. Although the health care system has experimented for decades
with different approaches to provider payment, until recently
little attention had been paid to delivering useful increments of
care at the lowest possible cost of production. In addition to
the systematic efforts currently being tested, a few innovative
health care providers have voluntarily adopted assembled, “allinclusive” prices for some surgical procedures and selected
other services.378
Some private insurers employ a technique called “valuebased insurance design” (V-BID), which offers more generous
coverage of services that are known to be effective.379 V-BID is
often applied to preventive screening based on the predictive
value of particular tests in a given subpopulation, but coverage
can also be modified to induce beneficiaries to receive care that
meets clinical guidelines, or to seek services from providers of
demonstrably higher quality or greater cost-effectiveness.380
V-BID represents an indirect strategy to improve the assembly
of individual treatments into effective packages through informed, incentivized consumer choice; it does not explicitly require providers to alter their production functions.381
“Bundled payment” programs come much closer to paying
for products rather than process steps or isolated inputs and
do so more directly.382 “Bundled” usually refers to a single
payment that encompasses both the professional (physician)
378
Michael E. Chernew et al., Value-Based Insurance Design, 26 HEALTH AFF.
195, 196 (2007); Tina Rosenberg, Revealing a Health Care Secret: The Price, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 2013 (describing the Surgery Center of Oklahoma, an ambulatory
surgery center owned by a group of conservative physicians).
379
See Chernew et al., supra note 378, at 203 (asserting value-based insurance Design (VBID) explicitly acknowledges and responds to patient
heterogeneity).
380
Id. at 195–96.
381
Id.
382
Jaspen, supra note 140 (explaining how bundled payment systems function); Jordan Rau, Hospitals Face Pressure From Medicare to Avert Readmissions,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2012, at D1 (explaining how, under the traditional payment
model, hospitals were not concerned with readmissions).
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and facility (hospital) components of conventional reimbursement systems, thereby rewarding care in which individuals
with complementary skills work together in technologically advanced practice settings.383 Such payments are also usually
“episodic,” meaning that they encompass a sustained period of
time, such as a full course of illness or the duration of a definitive (and typically effective) modality of treatment. The PROMETHEUS project, for example, was an early bundled payment
initiative in which private insurers attempted to reward the
coordinated delivery of care that met clinical practice guidelines for quality.384
An important bundled payment experiment was a pilot
program sponsored by the Integrated Healthcare Association
and the federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. It
aspired to negotiate twenty contracts between California insurers and providers for bundled payment, and to test not less
than 500 paid bundles for cost and quality.385
The pilot concluded in early 2014 and was judged a failure
by its evaluators, largely because it did not achieve the desired
scale.386 However, other experts drew constructive if nuanced
lessons from the experience that will be important in any larger
move toward assembled products that distinguishes bundled
payment from the wholesale transfer of insurance risk to providers. These lessons include paying retrospectively for the care
bundles actually delivered rather than projecting utilization in
advance, incorporating care redesign when creating payment
bundles, targeting markets that currently pay providers using
fee-for-service rather than capitation, and allowing Medicare to
lead the effort because of its size and measurement capacity.387
Despite these results, Medicare doubled down on bundled
payment in 2015. CMS expanded its optional Bundled Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI) program and declared that
383
Holly Korda & Gloria N. Eldridge, Payment Incentives and Integrated Care
Delivery: Levers for Health System Reform and Cost Containment, 48 INQUIRY 277,
280–82 (2011).
384
Peter S. Hussey et al., The PROMETHEUS Bundled Payment Experiment, 30
HEALTH AFF. 2116 (2011) (explaining that the name Prometheus was chosen in the
hopes that health care would be forever changed).
385
Tom Williams & Jill Yegian, Bundled Payment: Learning Payment from our
Failures, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 5, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/
08/05/bundled-payment-learning-from-our-failures/ [http://perma.cc/7BZAGZZ4].
386
Ridgely et al., supra note 36 (discussing California’s bundled care
initiative).
387
Williams & Yegian, supra note 385 (suggesting payers, providers, and policy makers should continue to pursue bundled payment initiatives).
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its Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement program would
apply bundled payment on a mandatory basis in seventy-five
markets.388 After decades of political posturing, Congress also
repealed its longstanding but never enforced Sustainable
Growth Rate (SGR) limitation on physician fees under Medicare, conditioned on the implementation of value-based payment systems such as bundling.389
2. Publish Prices and Results
Transparency rivals payment reform as the most popular
form of market-oriented health care regulation. Although
mandatory disclosure of information about health care delivery
can have various objectives—including loyalty to patients, internal process improvement, and stewardship of public resources—most disclosure initiatives over the last twenty years
have sought primarily to improve competition by better informing buyers about health plans or health care providers.390
Standardized information is seen as a remedy for unjustified variation in both quality and price. Early transparency
programs attempted mainly to measure and compare quality of
care. For hospitals and surgeons, they were often a response to
research showing wide variation in care processes and results.391 For health plans, they were instituted primarily to
address public concerns that managed care would shortchange
quality in order to reduce cost.392 When aggressive care man388
See Robert E. Mechanic, Mandatory Medicare Bundled Payment—Is it
Ready for Prime Time?, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1291, 1291 (2015); Suzanne
Delbanco, The Payment Reform Landscape: Bundled Payment, HEALTH AFF. BLOG
(July 2, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/07/02/the-payment-reformlandscape-bundled-payment [http://perma.cc/55YV-3YXY]; Steven A. Farmer et
al., Breaking Down Medicare’s Bold New Proposal to Transform Hip and Knee
Replacements, BROOKINGS (Aug. 11, 2015, 1:12 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/
blogs/health360/posts/2015/08/joint-replacement-model-care [http://perma.
cc/YZM5-SMA7].
389
See Billy Wynne, May the Era of Medicare’s Doc Fix (1997–2015) Rest In
Peace. Now What?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 14, 2015, 10:09 PM), http://healthaf
fairs.org/blog/2015/04/14/may-the-era-of-medicares-doc-fix-1997-2015-restin-peace-now-what [http://perma.cc/7SGE-FUNT].
390
Sage, supra note 128, at 1713–15 (assessing the justifications for requiring
insurance organizations and health care providers to disclose information to the
public).
391
Mark R. Chassin, Achieving and Sustaining Improved Quality: Lessons from
New York State and Cardiac Surgery, 21 HEALTH AFF. 40, 51 (2002) (explaining
that since 1989 the New York State Department of Health has published annual
data on risk-adjusted mortality following coronary artery bypass graft surgery by
hospital and surgeon).
392
Anna D. Sinaiko & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Increased Price Transparency in
Health Care—Challenges and Potential Effects, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 891, 891–92
(2011).
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agement receded as a threat to quality but spending continued
to rise, price transparency designed to aid comparison shopping became an equally important focus of disclosure
initiatives.393
With respect to quality, process-based measures have long
been regarded as inferior to verifiable outcomes such as avoidance of complications, relief of symptoms, or survival.394 But it
has been difficult to attribute outcomes to particular providers
when a mix of health care professionals and health facilities
supply and control care inputs for a given patient, or to meaningfully aggregate results under the umbrella of a health plan
when one beneficiary’s experience of care is so different from
another’s.
With respect to prices, publicizing fees for conventional
disaggregated services has had a similarly limited impact. For
many medical problems, it is often impossible to get a reliable
price quote in advance because nobody knows how many billable process steps will be taken or inputs used before diagnosis
or treatment is declared complete.395 Instead, current initiatives to contain cost through price transparency often encourage patients under active treatment to be prudent
purchasers of expensive diagnostic services, such as CT or MRI
scans, that can be multiply sourced.396 However, few patients
have sufficient expertise to make decisions about marginal inputs to complex care, especially when ill and under time pressure. By contrast, published prices and quality metrics are
much more meaningful for assembled products such as full
surgical treatment packages.397 Well-designed programs for
393
MEDICARE.GOV, How to Compare Medigap Policies (2014), http://
www.medicare.gov/supplement-other-insurance/compare-medigap/comparemedigap.html [http://perma.cc/QBB3-CAG2]; Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note
392, at 894 (suggesting one tactic for reducing spending is to increase price
transparency in health care).
394
Jonathan Mant, Process Versus Outcome Indicators in the Assessment of
Quality of Health Care, 13 INT’L J. FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 475, 475–80 (2001)
(reviewing the relative strengths and weaknesses of outcome and process measures as performance indicators in health care).
395
See Barbara Starfield et al., Ambulatory Care Groups: A Categorization of
Diagnoses for Research and Management, 26 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 53, 54 (1991)
(explaining that in ambulatory care, for example, doctors make many diagnoses
and generate bills at different sites).
396
See Kristin Madison & Peter D. Jacobson, Debate: Consumer-Directed
Health Care, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 107, 116–17 (2007) (arguing that a transparencydriven system will incentivize underinvestment in preventive measures).
397
At the Surgery Center of Oklahoma, for example, assembled prices available on the website include the facility fee, the surgeon’s fee, the anesthesiologist’s
fee, the initial consultation, and uncomplicated follow-up care. Implants and
similar devices are billed at cost without markup. SURGERY CTR. OF OKLA., Surgery
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both quality and price transparency therefore can help move
health care markets toward assembled products because assembled products are better suited for comparison shopping.
3. Distinguish Warranty Risk from Insurance Risk
Efforts to reduce fragmentation in health care delivery
without explicitly redefining the product tend to elide the distinction between “warranty risk” (the risk that a health care
service will not work as intended, also called “performance
risk”) and “insurance risk” (the risk that an individual will have
a covered medical need).398 For example, a commentary on the
failure of the IHA bundled payment pilot in California noted:
“Prospective bundled payment raised . . . concerns for . . .
regulators . . . , including whether providers were assuming
insurance risk.”399 Similarly, hospitals and physicians participating in the Medicare shared-savings (ACO) program have discovered that providing disassembled services for less than
Medicare expects to spend each year on a given beneficiary
requires essentially the same actuarial capacity as becoming a
full-fledged Medicare HMO.400
That capitation is the opposite of fee-for-service payment
has become a common misconception in health policy. The
false dichotomy likely arises from the bidirectional heritage of
health insurance as it has developed in the United States. On
one end of the spectrum, commercial insurers traditionally indemnified policyholders for the cost of process steps and components delivered or ordered by physicians. On the other end
of the spectrum, early HMOs such as Kaiser provided comprehensive care directly in exchange for an annual premium.401
Because neither sufficient capital nor compatible culture existed to replicate Kaiser-like HMOs on a national scale as managed care expended in the 1990s, many provider contracts
attempted to make physicians in private practice behave simiPricing (2015), http://www.surgerycenterok.com/pricing/ [http://perma.cc/
A45F-8SX7].
398
But cf. Tom Baker, Insuring Liability Risks, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.
128, 129 (2004) (offering a taxonomy of liability risk that includes warranty risk).
399
Williams & Yegian, supra note 385 (suggesting payers, providers, and policy makers should continue to pursue bundled payment initiatives despite previous failure in California).
400
See, e.g., Susan DeVore & R. Wesley Champion, Driving Population Health
Through Accountable Care Organizations, 30 HEALTH AFF. 41, 41–49 (2011) (outlining the criteria health systems must meet to participate in the ACO model).
401
RICKEY HENDRICKS, A MODEL FOR NATIONAL HEALTH CARE: THE HISTORY OF
KAISER PERMANENTE (HEALTH AND MEDICINE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY) 1–10 (1993)
(presenting a history of Kaiser-Permanente).
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larly by paying them a fixed monthly amount for each patient
assigned to them (i.e., capitation) regardless of how much care
they actually deliver, in essence making them partial insurers
of their patients’ health.402
If products are sold assembled, warranty risk has less
overlap with insurance risk and can be separately managed. If
a course of treatment fails to have the desired effect, a second
course of treatment can be delivered without charge. If an
unwanted side effect develops, steps to mitigate the effect can
be offered, again without charge. If these costs turn out to be
excessive for the seller, it is a signal that either the product
should be reengineered or the price charged for it should be
adjusted. In either event, however, the cost of the warranty
remains under the control of the seller and is based on the
product’s average anticipated user and use. As with many consumer products, more comprehensive warranties might be offered for higher prices, and health care providers (rather than
patients) are free to purchase stop-loss insurance against the
risk of unexpectedly high warranty costs.403
A few ongoing Medicare and private patient safety initiatives contemplate warranties, including nonpayment policies
for hospital readmissions that occur shortly after discharge, or
for “never events” such as wrong-site surgery or infections acquired in the hospital that are deemed preventable.404 But
government payers and state regulators can encourage warranties to be offered for a broader array of assembled products.
Geisinger Health System, for example, has experimented with a
402

See supra text accompanying note 192.
An interesting question, beyond the scope of this Article, is the potential
relationship between warranties for assembled health care products and medical
malpractice liability. For example, should a patient’s failure to cooperate in treatment constitute product misuse that voids the warranty, akin to contributory
negligence in tort? Little has been written about the use of warranties in medical
care. See William S. Brewbaker III, supra note 116, at 118–21 (arguing that
courts should impose a tort-based implied warranty of quality on managed care
organizations, under which they would be liable for selling physician services that
are negligently rendered).
404
Peter J. Pronovost et al., Preventing Bloodstream Infections: A Measurable
National Success Story in Quality Improvement, 30 HEALTH AFF. 628, 628–34
(2011) (discussing the success in combating central line-associated bloodstream
infections); AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, Patient Safety Primers: Never
Events, http://psnet.ahrq.gov/primer.aspx?primerID=3 [http://perma.cc/
K6PG-BJKM] (defining “never events”); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS,
Readmissions Reduction Program (2015), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/ReadmissionsReduction-Program.html [https://perma.cc/9ZKK-4Q76]; NAT’L QUALITY FORUM,
List of SREs (2015), http://www.qualityforum.org/Topics/SREs/
List_of_SREs.aspx [https://perma.cc/2LZU-EU6X].
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flat fee including a 90-day warranty for certain cardiovascular
and orthopedic procedures.405
4. Try New Products and Producers
Assembled products offering quicker, cheaper, more reliable health care will only develop if competitors with fresh ideas
continually enter the market. New competitors are more likely
to create products with intuitive appeal and measurable benefits. Generating new health care products and services therefore should be a priority for regulators working in tandem with
competition authorities. Unlike many clinical innovations today, notably medical devices and imaging technologies, future
entrants should do more than fit their products into the existing schema of “fee-for-input” payment.406 Over time, this
process could induce a virtuous circle that continues to redefine health care products and invites even greater diversity in
sources of supply and methods of production.
To encourage competition from unaccustomed sources,
policymakers should dismantle regulatory barriers that discourage market entry by new types of health facilities, such as
burdensome permitting and certification requirements,407 and
by health care professionals, such as restrictive professional
licensing laws.408 Reducing barriers to entry is also important
from the perspective of antitrust enforcement. If entry is easy,
405
See Reed Abelson, In Bid for Better Hospital Care, Heart Surgery with a
Warranty, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2007, at A1. Not discussed in the article is the fact
that Geisinger apparently offers its “Proven Care” guarantee only to patients enrolled in its own health plan and not to those covered by other commercial insurance. This significantly reduces the financial risk of poor performance and allows
Geisinger to continue to be paid by others for treating complications.
406
Katherine Hobson, Cost of Medicine: Are High Tech Medical Devices and
Treatments Always Worth It?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 10, 2009), http://
health.usnews.com/health-news/best-hospitals/articles/2009/07/10/cost-ofmedicine-are-high-tech-medical-devices-and-treatments-always-worth-it [http://
perma.cc/76ZZ-QE6D] (questioning whether expensive medical tools are
overused).
407
See Nancy Pfotenhauer & Nathan Nascimento, States Strike a Blow for
Freedom in the ObamaCare Age, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/nancy-pfotenhauer-and-nathan-nascimento-states-strike-a-blowfor-freedom-in-the-obamacare-age-1424482226 [https://perma.cc/857P-4CM5].
408
See, e.g., N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1107–17
(2015); see also Teladoc, Inc. v. Texas Medical Board, No. 1:15–cv–00343–RP
(W.D. Tex. 2015) (antitrust suit by a telehealth company against a state medical
board for prohibiting the writing of a prescription without a face-to-face visit);
William M. Sage, Competitive Harm from State Licensing Boards: First North Carolina Dentists, Now Texas Physicians?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 2015), http://
healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/05/27/competitive-harm-from-state-licensingboards-first-north-carolina-dentists-now-texas-physicians/ [http://perma.cc/
93ZA-VLTC] (describing and assessing the Teladoc litigation).
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market power cannot be exercised even in concentrated markets without attracting alternative sources of supply that
would return prices to competitive levels.409 Moreover, ease of
market entry should intensify overall innovation, further reducing the risk of consumer harm from concentration.
5. Empower True Consumers
That patients need to be partners in their own care is a
possible objection to assembled products.410 It is true that
patients can either enhance or undercut the effectiveness of
treatment and therefore the apparent rewards from offering a
superior product.411 As in other commercial sectors, however,
consumers become motivated when they understand what they
are buying and can compare their options. People seeking
medical care may be vulnerable and in need of compassionate,
expert assistance, but being limited to disaggregated, unwarranted services exploits that vulnerability to a greater degree
than if products came assembled with warranties.
To date, personal responsibility has mainly been incorporated into health insurance design, not utilization of care. Because of the perverse incentives associated with spending other
people’s money (“moral hazard”), health savings accounts,
high-deductible health plans, and similar forms of “consumerdirected care” have become increasingly popular with more
conservative constituencies.412 However, even prudent people
can quickly incur thousands of dollars in health expense for
disaggregated services. A move to assembled products would
make it easier for such individuals to comparison shop based
on price without shortchanging or otherwise misinterpreting
their medical needs. Over time, assembled products could
bridge the gap between consumer-directed care models and the
“comprehensive coverage” mindset of the ACA because direct
409
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 200, § 4.2 (discussing barriers to entry).
410
See Joanna Kaufman, Patients as Partners, 39 NURSING MGMT. 45, 48
(2008) (discussing the history of the “patients as partners” concept).
411
Using the more paternalistic terminology of conventional medical professionalism, the same idea is sometimes called “patient compliance,” meaning acquiescence in the plan of treatment selected by the physician. See TO ERR IS
HUMAN, supra note 118, at 34-35 (pointing out patient noncompliance as an
important quality issue in health care).
412
See JOHN C. GOODMAN, PRICELESS: CURING THE HEALTHCARE CRISIS 143–57
(2012) (asserting the United States needs real health care change, starting with
health savings accounts). But see Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,
75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 243 (1996) (exploring the shortcomings of moral hazard as a
neutral, technical basis for reforming tort law, workers’ compensation, health
insurance, and social welfare programs).
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sellers of services would have less ability to take advantage of
buyers.413
Regulators therefore might apply a lighter hand to directto-consumer sales for assembled than for unassembled health
care products,414 using a consumer protection model to promote both customization of assembled products by sellers and
correct use of those products by consumers. Admittedly, it is
difficult to draw a line between lack of user friendliness, which
producers should have strong incentives to improve, and misuse, which should obligate the consumer to purchase another
or a different product. However, complex medical products
should not require self-assembly by patients any more than
they should require ad hoc assembly by physicians, as they do
at present.
6. Assure Interoperability
Many health care services require expert coordination,
much as one flies on a reputable commercial airline rather
than separately hiring a plane, pilot, and maintenance crew.
Because so few health care products are sold assembled, assembly is considerably harder than it should be. Beyond the
purely mechanical realm of items such as IV tubing and surgical supplies, surprisingly few components of complex health
care fit together.
The development and adoption of industrial standards that
enable interoperable technology is a precondition to the efficient production of assembled products in many care settings.
Digital devices such as electrocardiogram machines, radiographic scanners, and chemical assayers seldom talk with one
another or with the often idiosyncratic electronic health record
systems that hospitals and physicians have installed.415
413
For example, the federal government recently prohibited supplemental fees
for biopsies performed during screening colonoscopies, which are covered without
cost-sharing under the ACA. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., COVERAGE OF COLONOSCOPIES UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S PREVENTION BENEFIT 11 (2012), http://
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/8351-coverage-of-colonos
copies-under-the-affordable-care-act.pdf [http://perma.cc/P3P7-QEKL]. In essence, this converted screening colonoscopy into an assembled product for the
diagnosis of large bowel disease.
414
Cf. Matthew F. Hollon, Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of Prescription Drugs:
Creating Consumer Demand, 281 JAMA 382, 384 (1999) (discussing the pharmaceutical industry’s rapid increase in marketing prescription drugs directly to patients and the FDA’s relaxed regulation of this practice).
415
See INST. OF MED., HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY: BUILDING SAFER SYSTEMS FOR
BETTER CARE 19 (2012) (concluding “the current culture of care delivery is often
not ready for widespread safer and more effective use of health IT”).
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Lack of interoperability also extends to communication
and teamwork among skilled personnel. Health care teams
seldom function as smoothly as teams in true “high-reliability”
industries.416 Industrial engineering that takes account of
human factors in designing standardized work environments
and training personnel therefore is critical for preventing medical errors and promoting successful outcomes.417
More generally, standards for interoperability tend to improve innovation and induce the entry of additional competitors by reducing the cost of contracting between new and
existing market participants.418 Because of this, dominant
health care providers may resist or attempt to undermine standards for interoperability, requiring vigilance by the antitrust
enforcement agencies.419
For simpler health care, standards for interoperability
should help individuals assemble their own packages of services. Airlines thrive, but there are few remaining travel agents
because most travelers can construct their own itineraries using standardized electronic tools. Similarly, “coordination of
care” was traditionally the professional obligation of one’s general practice physician, and its loss is often lamented as a
casualty of specialization. However, low-risk patients may not
need close or comprehensive attention, especially if it adds another layer of intermediation to a system that is already unresponsive to consumer preferences. Instead, regulators should
promote “plug and play” capability, including for the exchange
of health information, enabling consumers to manage their
own care from diverse sources in real time.
7. Clarify the Role of Health Insurers
The unequal distribution of illness, its unpredictable timing, and the high cost of care make insurance an inevitable
aspect of a functioning health care system. Still, although
416
See M. Leonard, S. Graham & D. Bonacum, The Human Factor: The Critical
Importance of Effective Teamwork and Communication in Providing Safe Care, 13
QUALITY SAFE HEALTH CARE 85, 90 (2004) (noting effective communication and
teamwork are essential for the delivery of high quality, safe patient care).
417
See Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1851 (1994) (indicating that “a substantial number of patients suffer treatment-caused injuries
while in the hospital”); INST. OF MED., supra note 119, at 26 (estimating that as
many as 98,000 people die in any given year from medical errors that occur in
hospitals).
418
See Baker, supra note 280, at 560–62 (noting that “antitrust enforcement
against exclusionary conduct is important because it fosters economic growth
and prosperity, not just because it addresses harms to price competition”).
419
See id. at 561.
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commercial health insurers remain ubiquitous, the value they
add is increasingly in doubt. As discussed above, underwriting
risk has diminished for the majority of health insurers, either
because that function can be performed at lower cost by large,
self-insured employers and government (Medicare and Medicaid) or because laws such as the ACA limit insurers’ actuarial
role and cushion the financial uncertainty associated with
it.420 Thus, much of what is called health insurance is primarily the provision of administrative services: managing enrollment, verifying eligibility, contracting with health care
providers, and processing claims.421
Because the future of health insurance beyond administration is uncertain, health insurers are likely to diversify their
operations to include other functions, such as care coordination, price brokering, health information stewardship, and
health promotion. Whether the ACA will induce more insurers
to be actual care managers offering assembled products remains to be seen.422 Insurers’ current dependence on claims
processing to earn revenue may exert drag on any shift to assembled products because consolidating services into larger
packages would tend to reduce the overall volume of claims.423
Regulators should be alert to such dampened incentives for
change and to status quo bias associated with current patterns
of managed care contracting.
If conventional health insurance recedes in importance,
regulators will need to anticipate and address other ways in
which the unequal distribution of illness may complicate competition over assembled products. Examples include preventing profiteering in connection with urgent care or lifethreatening illness, overseeing companies selling warranty insurance to health care providers, and using public funds to
support reserve capacity (e.g., emergency care for epidemics or
disasters) so that day-to-day production decisions can be made
with lean inventory and flexible staffing.

420

See Sage, supra note 133, at 1090.
See supra text accompanying notes 53–55.
422
One consideration is that the ACA “risk-adjusts” premiums received by
health plans to reduce cherry-picking of healthy enrollees, provide assurances of
profitability, and maintain overall budget neutrality. See Sage, supra note 133, at
1090. These risk-reduction devices may promote overall insurance market stability, but they also may tend to diminish competition between carriers.
423
See supra text accompanying notes 94–100.
421
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8. Promote “Upstream” Health Care
An affordable health care system depends on good underlying health as well as cost-effective treatment.424 It will take
innovation for the United States to reduce preventable mortality and morbidity to the levels found in many other developed
countries.425 Although population health is often considered a
government function administered by state and local health
departments, networked technologies create enormous opportunities for private entrepreneurship.426
Imagine people navigating a river, with their health worsening as the journey progresses. As people get farther from
home, assistance becomes available, but it is abundant only
when travelers are in distant lands and in great peril, with
rescue costly and uncertain. This downstream realm represents the vast majority of U.S. health care as currently configured. Upstream, the current is slower, the shore is nearer,
and people are closer to home. There are no “patients” removed
from their daily lives; there are only people living those lives.
Upstream competition policy should foster the development of
diverse sources of care widely distributed throughout communities, facilitate public access to these services, and encourage
self-management of health and illness. Services that can accomplish these goals may be less complex than those associated with acute or severe illness, but they will still need to be
assembled for direct consumer use.
It is therefore important that regulators not allow existing
health insurers, health care providers, or pharmaceutical companies to foreclose competition by extending their existing regulatory advantages upstream.427 Potentially problematic
conduct might include influencing professional licensing and
discipline, leveraging facility licensing or certificates of need,
manipulating accreditation standards, or otherwise taking unfair advantage of incumbents’ familiarity with complex regulatory systems. For example, mobile medical applications
(mHealth) constitute a rapidly growing commercial sector that
424

See Sage, supra note 133, at 1085.
See Steven H. Woolf & Laudan Y. Aron, The US Health Disadvantage Relative to Other High–Income Countries, 309 JAMA 771, 772 (2013) (comparing Americans’ health to that of other countries of similar economic status).
426
See, e.g., William H. Frist, Connected Health and the Rise of the PatientConsumer, 33 HEALTH AFF. 191, 192 (2014) (discussing consumer products to
improve health behaviors).
427
Governance of upstream health care will differ in many ways from governance of downstream health care. See Sage & McIlhattan, supra note 104, at 53738.
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the FDA has wisely refrained from regulating unless there is a
clear risk to health or safety.428
CONCLUSION
Improved competition, greater productive efficiency, and
enhanced consumer value are no longer optional in American
health care. Experts agree that the high health care spending
that prevails in the United States is not merely the price of
scientific progress or the consumption preferences of a prosperous and powerful nation, as it appeared in prior decades. It
has become a hard constraint on public money available for
other critical needs, such as education and infrastructure, a
drain on employment compensation that crowds out cash
wages, and a long-term threat to the fiscal stability of the
United States.429
This Article urges antitrust enforcers and regulators to rethink the products that the health care system buys and sells.
Because market competition usually determines its own goals,
a directive approach to competition policy may seem counterintuitive. Health care products, however, are heavily influenced
by decades of accreted laws and professional norms that enable both the medical profession and the insurance industry to
cast long shadows over the health care economy. Users of
health care are seldom choosers of health care, and even less
often bear the costs.430 Prices are simultaneously extravagant
and invisible. As a result, some parts of health care are astonishingly innovative (e.g., how to keep preterm babies alive)
while others are surprisingly not (e.g., how to deal with a
sprained ankle on a Sunday).
Although the Affordable Care Act articulates a “triple aim”
for health care reform, including improvements in individual
428

See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSFOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 8 (2015), http://www.fda.gov/down
loads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/
UCM263366.pdf [http://perma.cc/V38U-XU83]. But see Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 227 (2014) (arguing that
regulators need not be tentative about regulating mobile health technologies).
429
Political opponents may deride the Obama administration’s claim to pursue deficit reduction through health reform, but health care remains the only
sector in which achievable efficiencies yield savings exceeding full percentage
points of GDP. See Peter R. Orszag, Will Burwell Corral Health-Care Costs?,
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Apr. 14, 2014, 11:53 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/arti
cles/2014-04-14/will-burwell-corral-health-care-costs [http://perma.cc/C38E-9
FSA] (describing potential for health care reform to substantially reduce federal
debt).
430
See supra notes 410–12 and accompanying text.
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health, population health, and economic efficiency,431 antitrust authorities have yet fully to internalize its priorities into
their enforcement strategies. Instead, a considerable amount
of antitrust enforcement remains mired in market models that
emerged during the political backlash against managed care in
the late 1990s and that have not produced significant benefits
for consumers.432 Antitrust enforcers should recognize the artificiality of what currently passes for competition in health
care and should work collaboratively with regulators to move
health care markets beyond trade in disaggregated process
steps and inputs to the sale of fully assembled products with
warranties.
The ACA, which has very likely achieved political permanence, relies primarily on market forces to boost performance
in the health care system.433 Unfortunately, efforts to improve
the cost-effectiveness of health care have a discouraging history, with few accomplishments outside the traditional HMO
model.434 Reversing the scarcity of assembled products may
begin to secure for health care the efficiency gains that free
enterprise has brought to almost every other economic sector.
Experienced clinicians are seldom fooled by miracle cures.
Serious illnesses that are slow to develop are typically slow to
reverse, wisdom that applies also to the severe and complex
pathology of the American health care system. Redirecting antitrust enforcement and associated regulation to favor assembled, warrantable products is not a panacea for market failure
in health care. It is, however, a critical supplement to the
analytics currently being employed by competition policymakers in pursuit of their goals.

431
432
433
434

See
See
See
See

INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, supra note 206.
BERENSON & BURTON, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying notes 1, 7.
supra text accompanying notes 152–55.
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